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Network security is an essential part of designing today’s corporate networks. Tradi-
tionally security threats have been addressed by using network segmentation, firewalls,
intrusion detection systems and so forth. However, most of the networks are still
vulnerable to attacks coming from inside the internal network. Users in enterprise
environments are becoming increasingly mobile when desktop computers are changing
to portable computers and handheld devices. From a security perspective this poses new
threats. The devices are moved outside the secure corporate network and connected to
insecure networks in airports, hotels, cafe´s, etc. Their security software that defends
from malicious users might not be up to date which may expose the device to infection.
When the device is connected back to the corporate environment, the whole network
might become under threat.
Network Access Control based on Endpoint Integrity is a set of mechanisms to enforce
security policies for network devices. The idea is that network access is granted only
after certain compliance checks have been passed. Non-compliant endpoints can be
denied access or they can be isolated into a dedicated network segment where they
can be remediated. Remediation is the process where a non-compliant node is made
compliant by applying necessary changes into configurations, installing the latest virus
signatures, etc.
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Tietoturva on keskeinen osa nykyaikaista verkkosuunnittelua. Perinteisesti tietoturvaa
on pyritty parantamaan ka¨ytta¨ma¨lla¨ mm. verkkojen segmentointia, palomuureja seka¨
erilaisia IDS/IPS-ja¨rjestelmia¨. Ongelma nykypa¨iva¨n organisaatioissa on yha¨ enemma¨n
ja enemma¨n liikkuvat ka¨ytta¨ja¨t. Kannettavat tietokoneet ovat syrja¨ytta¨neet perinteiset
po¨yta¨tietokoneet, mika¨ tuo uusia riskeja¨ tietoturvana¨ko¨kulmasta silla¨ laitteet liikkuvat
suojatun yritysverkon ulkopuolelle. Ka¨ytta¨va¨t kytkeva¨t laitteita julkiseen verkkoon
lentokenta¨lla¨, kahviloissa seka¨ hotellien aulassa. Julkisissa verkoissa koneet altistuvat
helpommin hyo¨kka¨yksille. Mika¨li laitteen tietoturva-asetukset eiva¨t ole ajan tasalla
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Pa¨a¨telaitteen eheyteen pohjautuva verkon pa¨a¨synvalvonta on joukko mekanismeja,
joiden avulla pa¨a¨telaitten tietoturva-asetukset voidaan pakottaa ma¨a¨ritettyjen tietotur-
vaka¨yta¨nto¨jen mukaisiksi. Laitteen muodostaessa yhteyden verkkoon sille tehda¨a¨n ti-
etyt tarkistukset, joiden pohjalta pa¨a¨teta¨a¨n sallitaanko laitteen pa¨a¨sy verkkoon. Laitteet,
jotka eiva¨t vastaa tietoturvaka¨yta¨nto¨ja¨, voidaan erista¨a¨ erilliseen karanteeniverkkoon,
jossa laitteiden asetukset voidaan palauttaa ka¨yta¨nto¨jen mukaisiksi esimerkiksi asenta-
malla uusimmat virustunnisteet.
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11 Introduction
Network Access Control (NAC) is a general terminology for mechanisms that are used
in computer networks to restrict access to network resources based on security policies.
The traditional methods of controlling access to a network have been authentication and
authorization. Authentication is the process of verifying that the client is actually who
it claims to be, and authorization means granting or denying access to resources, often
based on identity information received from the authentication process.
In modern times computers have gotten increasingly mobile, which has led to new kinds
of security threats from a networking perspective. Traditionally the biggest challenge of
network operators has been blocking attacks from malicious clients by using such mecha-
nisms as NAC described above and other network security mechanisms, such as network
segmentation, firewalls and Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS). The
problem with these mechanisms is that they usually assume that the attack comes from a
malicious client. The problem with mobile computers and users is that the computers are
connected into public networks in airports, cafe´s, etc. The clients usually have some kind
of client security software installed to protect them from security threats. However there
will be times when the client security software is turned off due to a user being frustrated
by it consuming too many resources, or the operating system or software program on the
client is out of date because it has not received the latest security updates. Any of these
scenarios may lead into a situation where the client is exposed to security threats. If the
client gets infected and then connects to the internal network, the infection may propagate
to other clients within the network. In this situation the attack is coming from what seems
to be a legitimate client. Internal networks are often considered more secure than public
networks and the clients may be configured with less strict security settings which makes
them vulnerable. This can even strengthen the possible impact of the infection on the
network.
One possible resolution for the problems described above would be to make the access
control decision based on the endpoint’s integrity or security posture. The integrity is a
collection of security measurements that define the security state of the client, and these
integrity measurements can be compared to a set of security policies predefined to decide
whether the client is compliant and granted access to the network. Possible integrity
measurements could include the state of a client firewall or antivirus software and whether
the client’s operating system is up to date.
At the time of writing, there are several commercial products for integrity-based net-
work access control. Such vendors as Cisco, Juniper, HP, Symantec and Microsoft have
brought their solutions into market but currently the architecture lacks standardization
which makes the implementations of different vendors unable to inter-operate. Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) is a non-profit organization formed to promote vendor-neutral
industry standards for secure computing [2]. TCG has developed an architecture for
integrity-based network access control called Trusted Network Connect (TNC). TNC is
an attempt at interoperability between the implementations of different vendors, but un-
fortunately currently most of the implementations are not compatible with the TNC.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has also a working group defining standards
for integrity-based network access control. IETF Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA)
is a working group formed to agree standards for this area. IETF NEA has drafted a
requirements document for reference architecture [4] and is going to solicit candidate
protocol specifications and evaluate them as candidate specifications. Currently there are
drafts for two of the protocols in the NEA reference architecture and they are derived
from the TNC architecture.
The goal of this thesis is two-fold: The primary goal is to analyze how a current com-
mercial implementation conforms to one of the proposed vendor-neutral standards. The
secondary goal is to evaluate the future of Network Access Control Based on Endpoint
Integrity (NAC-EI). Thus the starting point for this study is to describe an industry stan-
dard architecture for NAC-EI and then compare it to a commercial implementation. The
industry standard chosen for this study is the TNC architecture, because it is currently
the most comprehensive standard available. Microsoft Network Access Protection (NAP)
will be compared to TNC because NAP and TNC are claimed to interoperate [1]. Based
on this analysis, an evaluation of the discussion of NAC-EI implementations is provided.
The emphasis in this thesis is on the architectural design of the NAC-EI implementations.
Thus the major achievement is to provide an overview of the two architectures described.
TNC and NAP share a lot of similarities as evidenced by the comparison of these frame-
works. This is not a coincidence as Microsoft is one of the contributors of the TNC Work
Group. When analyzing the current market situation we saw that the main competing
frameworks are the TNC and Cisco Network Admission Control (CNAC). The conclu-
sion was that out of these two the TNC is becoming the leading framework for NAC-EI.
The main reason for this is the fact that TNC is becoming an IETF standard.
This thesis is divided into three parts. Chapter 2 describes the TNC architecture in detail.
In chapter 3 we evaluate the Microsoft NAP architecture and compare it to TNC. Chapter
4 provides a brief analysis of the future of NAC-EI standards and implementations.
32 Industry Standards for NAC-EI
This chapter presents an overview of current industry standards for Network Access Con-
trol based on Endpoint Integrity (NAC-EI). The chapter focuses on Trusted Network Con-
nect (TNC) by describing the building blocks of the architecture.
2.1 Background
This section is an overview of the current industry standards and work groups defining
architectures for NAC-EI.
2.1.1 Trusted Network Connect (TNC)
Trusted Computing Group is a non-profit organization founded in 2003 to develop and
promote vendor-neutral open standards for computer security. The TCG has members
and contributors from industry leading companies, such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Ju-
niper and Microsoft. The standards involve hardware building blocks and software inter-
face specifications across multiple hardware platforms and operating systems. The most
widely implemented TCG standard is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which is a
hardware module used for storing cryptographic keys. Most of today’s laptops, especially
the ones designed for business users, have a TPM chip installed. The TPM has been also
accepted as an ISO/IEC standard [27]. [2]
Trusted Network Connect (TNC) is an architecture developed by the TCG that enables
access control based on endpoint integrity in addition to traditional authentication and
authorization. The goal of TNC is to enable network operators to define policies regarding
the security state of endpoints. The endpoint’s compliance with these security policies can
then be used to determine whether to grant or deny access to a network resource. The TNC
architecture will be described more granularly later in this study. [3]
2.1.2 Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA)
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is also working on standardizing protocols
for NAC-EI. The architecture is referred as Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) and the
work group defining the architecture is Network Endpoint Assessment Working Group
(NEA WG). NEA uses the term ”posture” to refer to the security state of an endpoint.
The posture of an endpoint is derived from such information as hardware and software
configuration including whether a software component installed to protect the endpoint
(e.g., an anti-virus program or client firewall) is up-to-date. The goal of NEA is to provide
a standard way of assessing the posture of an endpoint for the purpose of monitoring
compliance to the posture policy of the organization. [4]
The NEA supports two deployment scenarios: advisory mode and mandatory mode. In
advisory mode the endpoint is granted unrestricted access to the network regardless of the
4result of the posture assessment. This deployment scenario can be used for just monitoring
the posture of the endpoints. In mandatory mode the endpoint gains only restricted access
to support remediation purposes, i.e. to bring the endpoint compliant with the posture
policy. Defining mechanisms for providing restricted access is out of the scope of the
NEA WG. [4]
Figure 1: NEA Reference Model [4]
Figure 1 describes the reference model for Network Endpoint Assessment. The NEA
Client is comprised of three kinds of components: Posture Collectors, Posture Broker
Client and Posture Transport Clients. These components communicate with their coun-
terparts on the NEA Server. The Posture Collectors exchange posture information with the
Posture Validators using the Posture Attribute Protocol (PA). The Posture Broker Client
and Posture Broker Server multiplex and de-multiplex these messages and communicate
with each other using the Posture Broker Protocol (PB). The Posture Transport Client
is responsible for establishing a reliable communication channel with the NEA Server.
There may be multiple Posture Transport Clients within a particular Posture Broker Client
to support multiple protocols. Each Posture Transport Client communicates with a Pos-
ture Transport Server using a Posture Transport Protocol (PT). Defining the PT is out of
the scope of the NEA WG as there are existing protocols that can be used for the PT. The
dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and/or
protocols between the components within the NEA Client or NEA Server. Standardizing
these interfaces is also out of scope of the NEA WG.
When standardizing the Posture Attribute Protocol and Posture Broker Protocol the NEA
WG has recognized that there already exist several non-standard protocols that may fill
5the requirements for the PA ad PB. Currently the NEA WG has accepted the IF-M and
IF-TNCCS from the TNC architecture as candidate protocols [5] [6].
2.2 TNC Architecture
The Trusted Network Connect (TNC) architecture is based on the TCG Infrastructure
Work Group (IWG) Reference Architecture for Interoperability which is an architecture
aiming at improving interoperability between systems containing TCG technology [7].
One of the most important concepts in the architecture is Trusted Platform, which refers
to hardware-protected platform authentication. In practice this is equivalent of using a
Trusted Platform Module [27], which is a computer chip that can store securely artifacts
that can be used for platform authenticaion.
The IWG Platform-Authentication model defines three entitites: Requestor, Verifier and
Relying Party as depicted in Figure 2. Requestor is the platform seeking to be authenti-
catied by the verifier. The Requestor is performing a transaction with the Relying Party
which relies on the Verifier to evaluate the statements issued by the Requestor. The Ver-
ifier performs the evaluation of the Requestor’s statements based on some set of criteria
or rules. One example of this kind of a network access control architecture is the IEEE
802.1X. In this example the requestor would be an 802.1X Supplicant, the relying party
would be an 802.1X Authenticator (e.g., switch) and the verifier would be a 802.1X Au-
thentication Server. [8] [3]
Figure 2: The IWG Platform-Authentication model
In the TNC architecture, the three main components are Access Requestor (AR), Policy
Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) as shown in Figure 3. The
AR is equivalent to Requestor in the IWG Architecure, the PDP maps to Verifier and the
PEP acts as the Relying Party. The naming convention is quite describing as the Access
Requestor is the client requesting for access to the network. The Policy Decision Point
is the party that makes the actual access decision, and Policy Enforcement Point is the
component that enforces the decision made by the PDP. [3]
Figure 4 shows a more detailed view of the TNC Architecture. The entities are depicted
by the five columns in the figure. The different entities are the Access Requestor (AR), the
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the Metadata Access
Point (MAP) and Flow Controllers and Sensors. The entities can be divided into three
layers which distinguish different components within each entity. The interfaces between
the components are depicted with the dashed lines and arrows.
6Figure 3: A simplified view of the TNC Architecture
Figure 4: The TNC Architecture
2.3 TNC Layers
The TNC architecture divides into three layers: network access layer, integrity evaluation
layer and integrity measurement layer. The network access layer is responsible for net-
work connectivity. This can involve several network technologies such as Virtual Private
Networking (VPN) and 802.1X. The three components within the network access layer
are Network Access Requestor (NAR), Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Network
Access Authority (NAA). [3]
The integrity evaluation layer contains components that are responsible for evaluating
the overall integrity of the Access Requestor. The components on the integrity evaluation
layer use the information received from the integrity measurement layer as input. The two
components within the integrity evaluation layer are the TNC Client and the TNC Server.
The integrity measurement layer contains the components that collect and verify integrity
information, i.e., Integrity Measurement Collectors (IMCs) and Integrity Measurement
Verifiers (IMVs). [3]
72.4 TNC Entities and Components
The entities and components in the TNC Architecture are logical, not physical. A com-
ponent or an entity may be a software program, a physical device or a replicated set of
machines to serve redundancy. The entities can be divided into required entities and op-
tional entities. The required entities are the Access Requestor (AR) and the Policy Deci-
sion Point (PDP). The optional entities are the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Metadata
Access Point (MAP), and Flow Controllers and Sensors. [3]
Access Requestor (AR) is the entity seeking access to a protected network in order to con-
duct activities in the network. The AR consists of three components: Network Access Re-
questor (NAR), TNC Client (TNCC) and Integrity Measurement Collector (IMC). NAR is
the component responsible for establishing network access with the PEP and PDP. There
may be several NARs within a single AR to support various connection mechanisms.
Examples of NARs include VPN client software and IEEE 802.1X client. [3]
The TNCC is a software component that aggregates the integrity measurement informa-
tion received from the IMCs and communicates the integrity state of the client to the TNC
Server. There may be multiple IMCs within an AR and each IMC measures some aspect
of the endpoint posture. For example, one IMC can check the status of a client anti-virus
software while another IMC may check that the operating system has the latest security
updates installed. Because this kind of information often depend on the implementation,
vendors can implement their own IMCs to provide that kind of integrity measurements.
[3]
Policy Decision Point (PDP) makes the decision regarding the Access Requestor’s net-
work access request. The decision is made using the integrity information provided by
the AR and a predefined set of security policies. The PDP consists of three components:
Network Access Authority (NAA), TNC Server (TNCS) and Integrity Measurement Ver-
ifier (IMV). The NAA is the component that decides whether the AR should be granted
or denied access to the network. The NAA makes the decision based on the information
it gets from the TNCS. [3]
The TNCS is the component that manages the communication between the IMCs and
IMVs. The TNCS aggregates the Action Recommendations from the IMVs and combines
them into an overall Action Recommendation and sends it to the NAA. The IMV is a
software component that verifies some aspect of the integrity of the client. [3]
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is the name of the entity and component that executes the
network access decision made by the PDP. This decision might be to allow unrestricted
access to the network for the AR, to allow only restricted access, or to deny access. Exam-
ples of Policy Enforcement Points include network devices such as switches or wireless
access points.[3]
Metadata Access Point (MAP) is the name of the entity and component that allows other
components to publish, subscribe and query information about the integrity state of the
ARs. This allows components such as flow controllers and sensors to use the integrity
information, as well as other information about the endpoints. [3]
8Flow controllers are components that control the flows in the network based on infor-
mation obtained from the MAP. Examples of flow controllers include firewalls and rate
limiters that can block or limit the network traffic originated from or destined for a par-
ticular endpoint or user. Sensors are components that publish information about network
activities to the Metadata Access Point. Examples of such activities include an endpoint
accessing certain services in the network, authentication activities and broadcast messages
for services (e.g., DHCP). [3]
2.5 TNC Interfaces
This section describes the interfaces and protocols defined in the TNC architecture.
2.5.1 Integrity Measurement Collector Interface (IF-IMC) and Integrity Measure-
ment Verifier Interface (IF-IMV)
Integrity Measurement Collector Interface (IF-IMC) is the interface between the Integrity
Measurement Collectors and the TNC Client as depicted in Figure 5. Using the IF-IMC,
the TNC Client can collect integrity measurement information from the IMCs. The IF-
IMC is closely related to Integrity Measurement Verifier Interface (IF-IMV) which is the
interface between the Integrity Measurement Verifiers and the TNC Server.[9] [10]
Figure 5: The IF-IMC and IF-IMV
The supported use cases for IF-IMC[9]:
• A TNCC and one or more IMCs that support the same platform binding have been
installed on an endpoint. The TNCC finds and loads the IMCs. Then it runs one
9or more Integrity Check Handshakes. The IMCs and TNCC may use any of the
features of IF-IMC.
• A TNCC that supports the Java Platform Binding has restricted privileges/permissions
(as when loaded into a sandbox in a web browser). It loads IMCs that support the
Java Platform Binding and runs one or more Integrity Check Handshakes. The
IMCs may actually have greater privileges than the TNCC (or they may not be
sandboxed).
• A TNCC that supports the Java Platform Binding runs with generous privileges but
chooses to run IMCs with restricted privileges for security reasons. It loads IMCs
and runs one or more Integrity Check Handshakes.
• A TNCC is running on an endpoint. When an IMC is installed or uninstalled, the
TNCC notices this and loads or unloads the IMC.
The supported use cases for IF-IMV are [10]:
• An IMV and TNCS that support the same platform binding are installed on an
endpoint. The TNCS finds and loads the IMV. Then it runs one or more Integrity
Check Handshakes. The IMV and TNCS may use any of the features of IF-IMV.
• A TNCS has restricted privileges. It loads IMVs and runs one or more Integrity
Check Handshakes.
• A TNCS that supports the Java Platform Binding runs with generous privileges but
chooses to run IMVs with restricted privileges for security reasons. It loads IMVs
and runs one or more Integrity Check Handshakes.
• An IMV and a TNCS both support the reason string extensions to IF-IMV. An
IMV provides a reason string to a TNCS, giving the reason for its IMV Action
Recommendation. The TNCS logs this reason and/or passes it on to the TNCC
through an extension to IF-TNCCS. At the TNCC, the reason information may be
displayed to the user (perhaps in a detailed view). The reason string may be in the
endpoint user’s preferred language or (if that language is not available) in another
language.
• A TNCS is running. When an IMV is installed or uninstalled, the TNCC notices
this and loads or unloads the IMV.
IF-IMC and IF-IMV contain the following features: Integrity Check Handshake, Connec-
tion Management, Remediation and Handshake Retry, Message Delivery and Batches.
Integrity Check Handshake is the context that IMCs and IMVs use to exchange messages
with each other. This is a very important functionality as this enables IMVs to become
aware of the security state of the IMCs. This information exchange is the foundation for
the access control decision made by the PDP. In the Integrity Check Handshake the IMCs
send a batch of messages to the IMVs, and the IMVs may respond with a batch of mes-
sages. The response may contain queries for more information, remediation instructions,
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etc. In the end of this dialog the IMVs make their decision on their IMV Action Rec-
ommendations. Several Integrity Check Handshakes may occur between a TNCC and a
TNCS. The first handshake may end with the client receiving remediation instructions to
become compliant. After the remediation another handshake is performed to prove the
clients compliance, and subsequent handshakes might occur e.g., in the case of a policy
change. For a given TNCC-TNCS pair one handshake must always end before another
one begins. [9] [10]
The TNCC maintains the connection state by using a connection ID, which is an identifier
chosen when the connection is established. The connection ID is completely local for the
TNCC, so it is not shared with the TNCS. When a new network connection is established
the TNCC notifies the IMCs of the new connection and informs them if the state of the
connection is changed. When the connection ends the TNCC informs the IMCs that the
connection is terminated and that the connection ID will be deleted. However, the TNCC
should use the same connection ID while communicating with the same TNCS. This
allows the TNCC to request a handshake retry for an earlier connection, e.g., after it has
completed remediation. The remediation might require restarting the operating system or
power cycling, so the connection ID should be retained even during these operations in
order to be able to request the handshake retry. [9] [10]
There are a few scenarios when it is desirable to retry the Integrity Check Handshake
without establishing a new network connection with a new connection ID. If an endpoint
has been isolated and and then remediated an IMC can suggest the TNCC to retry the
Integrity Check Handshake with the existing connection ID without establishing a new
connection. The TNCS can also initiate a handshake retry as a result of a security policy
change or as a periodic activity. And finally, an IMC or IMV can request a handshake
retry in response to a condition detected by the IMC or IMV. [9]
The network access decision in the TNC architecture is based on information exchange
between IMCs and IMVs. That is why the message delivery between IMCs and IMVs a
critical function for the architecture. IF-IMC includes functions for sending and receiving
those messages. The message itself consists of a message body, a message type, and a
recipient type. The message body is sequence of bytes. The message type is a number
that uniquely defines the structure and semantics of the message body. The recipient type
is simply a flag that indicates whether the recipient is an IMC or an IMV. The TNCC and
TNCS should not parse the message body as it is done by the IMCs and IMVs. The IMCs
and IMVs announce to the TNCC and TNCS which message types they want to receive.
The TNCC and TNCS use the message type and recipient type to route the message to
correct recipient or recipients. [9] [10]
The messages between IMCs and IMVs are always carried over in batches. This is due to
the fact that these messages are often carried over protocols like Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) that require endpoints to take turns in sending messages i.e., only one
endpoint can send at the time. The first batch of messages is always sent by the IMC. The
IMV can respond to these messages and the IMCs can respond to the messages sent by
the IMV. This way the dialog goes on until the handshake is over. [9] [10]
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2.5.2 TNC Client-Server Interface (IF-TNCCS)
The IF-TNCCS defines a protocol for exchanging messages between the TNC Client and
TNC Server as described in Figure 6. The types of messages include [11]:
• Messages from IMCs to IMVs (e.g., integrity measurements)
• Messages from IMVs to IMCs (e.g., remediation instructions or requests for addi-
tional measurements)
• Messages from TNCCs to TNCSs (e.g., control messages)
• Messages from TNCSs to TNCCs (e.g., TNCCS-Recommendation message)
Figure 6: The IF-TNCCS
Supported use cases for IF-TNCCS are:
• The messages sent from IMCs to IMVs during the the Integrity Check Handshake
are carried through IF-TNCCS.
• During the Integrity Check Handshake the IMVs may optionally respond to the
IMCs (e.g., remediation instructions). These messages are carried through IF-
TNCCS.
• The TNCC may send a batch of messages to the TNCS by using IF-TNCCS. These
messages can be either standardize or vendor-specific.
• The TNCS may send a batch of messages to the TNCC by using IF-TNCCS. These
messages can be either standardize or vendor-specific.
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• IMVs may provide a reason string describing the reason for their IMV Action Rec-
ommendations. The TNCS may pass these reason strings to the TNCC by using an
extension to IF-TNCCS.
• The TNCS may inform the TNCC of its IP address and port number.
One of the primary functions of IF-TNCCS is to facilitate message exchanges between the
IMCs and IMVs so that the IMVs can TNC Server can assess the security state of the TNC
Client. The communication between the IMCs and IMVs is always performed within the
context of an Integrity Check Handshake, which was described earlier in context of the
IF-IMC and IF-IMV. [11]
The messages exchanged between the TNC Client and TNC Server contain a message
type, which is a four octet number uniquely identifying the format and semantics of the
message. To ensure uniqueness the message type is formed from a vendor ID and a
message subtype. The first three octets reflect the vendor ID, and the last octet describes
a vendor-chosen message subtype. SMI Private Enterprise Numbers are used to provide
the vendor IDs [14]. [11]
The IF-TNCCS contains a set of standardized TNCC-TNCS messages. These messages
are listed in table 1. All the standardized messages have the vendor ID of zero.
Table 1: TCG Standardized TNCC-TNCS Messages [11]
Message Type Value
TNCCS-Recommendation 0x00000001
TNCCS-Error 0x00000002
TNCCS-PreferredLanguage 0x00000003
TNCCS-ReasonStrings 0x00000004
TNCCS-TNCSContactInfo 0x00000005
The TNC Server sends a TNCCS-Recommendation to inform the TNC Client that the
Integrity Check Handshake has completed and that the TNCS is ready to provide the
TNCS Action Recommendation (allowed, isolated or none) for the NAA. The TNCCS
Action Recommendation is included in the message. As the name implies, it is only a
recommendation, and the NAA may ignore the decision made by the TNC Server and
apply a different level of access. [11]
A TNCCS-Error message is sent when there has been a problem with the previous batch
of messages. If the error message is sent from a TNC Client to the TNC Server then it
must be in a batch that doesn’t contain any IMC-IMV messages. If it’s sent from the TNC
Server to the TNC Client it must be placed into the same batch with the TNCS Action
Recommendation message. [11]
The TNC Client can send a TNCCS-PreferredLanguage to indicate its preferred lan-
guage to be used. This information is particularly useful when the IMV sends its rea-
son strings to the TNC Server subsequently to the TNC Client. The reason strings are
included in a TNCCS-ReasonStrings message, which is sent from the TNC Server to the
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TNC Client to explain the reason of the TNCS Action Recommendation. The TNCCS-
PreferredLanguage can contain multiple reason strings each of which should be tagged
with an RFC 3066 language tag [12] to indicate the language used. [11]
At the end of a successful assessment the TNC Server can use a TNCCS-TNCSContactInfo
message to inform the TNC Client of its IP address and port number. The TNC Client can
use this information to contact the TNC Server over L3 after it has been granted access to
the network. The use of TNCCS-TNCSContactInfo supports and enables the use if IF-T
over TLS [26] where the TNC Client is provided the IP address and port number of the
TNC Server during a layer 2 IF-T assessment and then uses that address and port number
to connect to the TNC Server. [11]
The messages between IMCs and IMVs are routed using two fields in the message: mes-
sage type and recipient type. Each IMC and IMV indicates which message types it wants
to receive. The TNCC and TNCS delivers the messages to those IMCs and IMVs that
have the recipient type and corresponding to the recipient type of the message and that
have announced to be willing to receive messages with the message type of the message.
[11]
The IMC-IMV and TNCC-TNCS messages are always sent in batches. The Integrity
Check Handshake starts with a batch of messages sent by the TNC Client to the TNC
Server. The IMC-IMV messages are delivered to the IMVs that have registered for the
corresponding message types. The TNCC-TNCS messages are parsed by the TNCS. If
the IMVs or the TNCS want to response to the messages received, the TNCS gathers these
messages into a batch and sends it to the TNCC. Again, the TNCC delivers the IMC-IMV
messages to the corresponding IMCs and pops any TNCC-TNCS messages. This dialog
goes on until the handshake is completed. If none of the IMCs want to send a message
in a particular batch batch the TNCC will complete the handshake by sending a batch
containing no IMC-IMV messages. This indicates to the TNCS that the TNCC has no
more measurements to provide and that it wants to complete the handshake. Similarly, if
none of the IMVs have messages to send in a batch, this indicates to the TNCS that the
IMVs are ready to give their IMV Action Recommendations. The TNCS gathers these
recommendatios into a TNCS Action Recommendations which is sent to the TNCC in a
batch containing no IMC-IMV messages. [11]
If the TNC Server receives a malformed batch, or has an internal error, it should discard
the batch and generate a TNCCS-Recommendation message containing a TNCCS-Error
message and send it to the TNC Client. Similarly, if a TNC Client receives a malformed
batch, or has an internal error, it should send a TNCCS-Error message to the TNC Server.
When the TNC Server receives the TNCCS-Error message, it should generate a TNCCS-
Recommendation message. [11]
IF-TNCCS is based on Extensible Markup Language (XML) and the format of the IF-
TNCCS messages is defined in the IF-TNCCS schema [11]. In addition the TNC-WG has
defined IF-TNCCS bindings for Statement of Health (SOH) protocol used by Microsoft
Network Access Protection (NAP). The goal is to enable interoperability between NAP
and systems based on the TNC architecture. [13]
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2.5.3 Vendor-Specific IMC-IMV Messages (IF-M)
IF-M refers to the vendor-specific information exchange between IMCs and IMVs as
depicted in Figure 7. IF-M is an application level protocol that carries Integrity Check
Handshake messages between IMCs and IMVs. The IF-M allows IMCs to send mea-
surement information about the local platform to IMVs for evaluation. The IMVs use
IF-M for requesting more measurement information or sending their IMV Action Rec-
ommendation to the client side. The recommendation may also contain instructions for
remediation. The TCG will standardize certain widely used IF-M messages, but most of
the messages will be specific to each IMC-IMV pair, i.e., vendor-specific. [22]
Figure 7: The IF-M
Table 2: IF-M Component Types [22]
Component Name Description
Reserved Reserved for use in specification exam-
ples, experimentation and testing.
Operating System Operating system running on the end-
point
Anti-Virus Host-based anti-virus software
Anti-Spyware Host-based anti-spyware software
Anti-Malware Host-based anti-malware software
Firewall Host-based firewall
Intrusion Detection / Prevention (IDS/IPS) Host-based intrusion detection / preven-
tion software
Virtual Private Networking (VPN) Host-based VPN software
IF-M messages are transported using IF-TNCCS protocol which provides a reliable end-
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to-end delivery to subscribed IMCs and IMVs. IF-TNCCS allows an IMC or IMV to
subscribe for a particular type of message indicating that the IMC or IMV is willing
to receive messages of that particular type. The message type indicates the software
component that is associated with the information contained in the IF-M message and
it is used by the TNCC and TNCS to route the messages to the IMCs and IMVs. The
message type is comprised of a Vendor ID and a message subtype. Table 2 lists the
message subtypes (i.e., component types) currently standardized by the TCG. [22]
Figure 8: An IF-TNCCS batch containing an IF-M message [22]
Figure 8 depicts an IF-TNCCS batch containing one or more IF-M messages. Each IF-
M message consists of a message header followed by zero or more assessment attributes.
The IF-M message header and the header for each of the attributes use a fixed type-length-
value (TLV) format.
2.5.4 Network Authorization Transport Protocol (IF-T)
Network Authorization Transport Protocol (IF-T) pertains to the message exchange be-
tween the Network Access Requestor and Network Access Authority. The TNC is not
standardizing IF-T as its own protocol, but provides bindings how to carry these messages
over existing lower layer protocols such as Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [15]
or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [18]. [3]
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is an authentication framework that provides
an infrastructure for network access clients and authentication servers to host plug-in
modules for existing and future authentication methods. EAP was originally developed
as an extension to Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [17] to support multiple authentication
mechanisms without having to pre-negotiate the mechanism during the link establishment
phase [15]. EAP is widely used in wireless networks but its support is not limited to
wireless networks. The IEEE 802.1X [8] authentication mechanism is based on EAP.
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Figure 9: The IF-T
Figure 10: Extensible Authentication Protocol
The three entities participating in EAP authentication are the authenticator, the peer and
the authentication server which is often also referred as EAP server. The relation between
these entities is depicted in Figure 10. Peer is entity seeking access to a network. In IEEE
802.1X the peer is called the supplicant. Authenticator is the entity requiring the peer
to authenticate before gaining access to the network. The authentication server authen-
ticates the peer and provides authentication information to the authenticator. In the case
where no backend authentication server is used, the authentication server is part of the
authenticator. Buf often the authenticator will send authentication decisions to a backend
authentication server in which case the authenticator is operating in pass-through mode.
One protocol used to relay EAP messages between the authenticator and authentication
server is RADIUS [16]. Figure 11 depicts IEEE 802.1X authentication using RADIUS
authentication server. [15] [8]
The EAP has two message types: Requests and Responses. The message exchange be-
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gins when the Authenticator sends a Request to the Peer. The Request packet contains
a Type field which indicates the type of data being carried. The Type field may indicate
authentication mechanism to be used, or it may carry some other information (e.g., dec-
lination of a proposed authentication mechanism). The EAP specification defines three
authentication types: MD5-Challenge [19], One-Time Password (OTP) [20] and Generic
Token Card (GTC). EAP is not limited to theses authentication methods but additional
authentication types may be defined. IETF has made a specification of using TLS within
EAP [21], and vendors may also define their own authentication types, or plug-in modules
to be used within EAP. Multiple authentication methods during an EAP conversation are
not supported. But this can be achieved by utilizing a single EAP method and running
other methods within it. This is referred as EAP tunneling. [15]
Figure 11: IEEE 802.1X
The TCG has defined protocol bindings for using IF-T over tunneled EAP methods. There
are a number of tunneled EAP methods that have been implemented by different vendors.
A tunneled EAP method consists of two phases: during the first phase a TLS tunnel
is created over EAP, and during the second phase other information is carried over the
protected TLS tunnel. The method providing the tunnels is referred as outer method, and
the method that is used over the tunnel is called inner method. The function of these
tunneled EAP methods is to provide a secure channel for exchanging other authentication
and authorization information. By using tunneled EAP methods otherwise insecure EAP
methods can be used securely as inner methods, as long as the outer method meets the
security requirements. [23]
Figure 12 describes the protocol layers that combine to provide IF-T using tunneled
EAP methods. The AAA Server refers to Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
Server, which is a general term for a server that controls access to computer resources.
The highlighted area indicates the layers that have components that are part of the IF-T
protocol binding for tunneled EAP methods. EAP-TNC is a simple EAP method that is
used as inner method in the dialog. EAP-TNC encapsulates IF-TNCCS messages they
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can be carried over tunneled EAP methods. The EAP-TNC can be carried over any EAP
tunneled method as long as both the peer and the authenticator use the same EAP method
and implement the conform to the same EAP-TNC standard. This allows a peer from one
tunneled method vendor to communicate with an authenticator from a diffenrent vedor.
[23]
Figure 12: EAP-TNC and EAP Protocol Layers [23]
The Access Client and Protocol Translator initiate the access control dialog by using
an access protocol. The Protocol Translator can be a wireless access point, a switch,
etc. Examples of access protocols include IEEE 802.1X and IKEv2 [24]. The Protocol
Translator and AAA Server exchange messages using an AAA protocol. Examples of
AAA protocols include RADIUS and Diameter [25]. There is no limitation for using
certain access or AAA protocols, as long as they support EAP authentication. Figure
13 shows how the messages are encapsulated using different protocols. The Protocol
Translator removes the Access Protocol headers (e.g., 802.1X or IKEv2) and forwards
the EAP message to the NAA using an AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS). [23]
The TCG also has also defined protocol bindings for using IF-T over TLS. Earlier was
described how EAP can be used to carry the assessment information prior to actually
connecting to the network, i.e., getting an IP address. In this case the assessment needs
to be carried within the protocol that is used during the joining process. But if the client
already has an IP address then it can utilize higher layer protocols such as TLS to carry
the assessment information. [26]
TLS is a protocol that allows applications to communicate across a network securely. TLS
provides authentication, confidentiality and data integrity and it is widely adopted in many
services including web servers and e-mail. The TLS protocol is composed of two layers.
19
Figure 13: IF-T protocol encapsulation [23]
TLS Record Protocol is the lower level component that operates on top of TCP or some
other reliable transport protocol. The TLS Record Protocol provides data privacy and
integrity. Data privacy is provided using symmetric cryptography (e.g., AES or RC4). The
symmetric encryption keys are negotiated using another protocol (e.g., TLS Handshake
Protocol). Data integrity is provided using Message Authentication Codes (MAC). The
TLS Record Protocol is used for encapsulating higher-level protocols. The current TLS
specification defines four content types or protocols that can be used on top of the Record
Protocol: the Handshake Protocol, the Alert Protocol, the Change Cipher Spec Protocol,
and the Application Data Protocol. TLS Handshake Protocol allows the endpoints to
authenticate each other and negotiate encryption algorithms and symmetric encryption
keys before the application starts transmitting data. The endpoints can be authenticated
by using public key cryptography (e.g., RSA or DSA) or with shared secrets (TLS-PSK).
The TLS Alert Protocol is used for informing the other endpoint of errors or warnings
and the TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol is used for changing ciphering parameters.
The TLS Application Data Protocol refers to the content type that is used for the data of
the application that is used on top of TLS. [18]
TLS provides very different connection properties than EAP because it provides a reliable
connection that can carry high data volumes as opposed to EAP which is designed to
support only small amounts of payload data. IF-T is used on top of TLS as an application
which means that IF-T is encapsulated within the TLS Record Protocol using application
data content type. [26]
The IF-T binding to TLS allows for either the TNC Client or TNC Server to establish the
TLS session and initiate the assessment process. Examples of situations where either the
TNC Client or TNC Server might initiate the assessment include:
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• The TNC Server notices suspicious behavior on an endpoint
• The TNC Server receives new security policies that require reassessment of the
TNC Client
• The TNC Client notices a change in its local security posture
• The TNC Client wants access to a protected network resource
Because either endpoint may initiate the TLS session, it means that both the TNC Client
and the TNC server need to be listening to a TCP port that is known by the other party.
When the TNC Server is the initiator, the TNC Client is effectively acting as the TLS
server which means that the TNC Client should also possess an X.509 certificate that is
used to protect the initial portion of the TLS handshake. Provisioning X.509 certificates
to all TNC Clients requires a quite heavy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which is one of
the reasons that it is actually recommended for the TNC Client not to listen for connec-
tion requests coming from the TNC Server. Instead, the TNC Client should proactively
establish and maintain a TLS session to the TNC Server so that either party may initiate
the assessment process over the existing TLS session. [26]
The IF-T over TLS message exchange occurs in three phases: TLS Setup, IF-T Pre-
Negotiation and IF-T Data Transport. During the TLS Setup phase the TLS session ini-
tiator (usually the TNC Client) establishes a TCP connection between the NAR and NAA.
After the TCP connection is established the TLS Handshake Protocol is used for nego-
tiating the cryptographic settings for the TLS session. During the negotiation the TLS
session responder (usually the TNC Server) provides a trustworthy X.509 certificate that
is used for authenticating the TLS responder. The TLS initiator may also provide a client
certificate to authenticate to the TLS responder. If the client supports X.509 certificate
with Subject Key Attestation Evidence (SKAE) [28] extensions it can be used in con-
junction with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [27] to provide hardware-based platform
authentication. Using TNC with TPM is described in section 2.7. After the TLS hand-
shake the NAR and NAA have a protected session to exchange messages which allows
the protocol to transition to the IF-T Pre-Negotiation phase. [26]
The IF-T Pre-Negotiation phase is performed only once during the lifetime of a TLS ses-
sion. This phase is used for the NAR and NAA to discover each other’s IF-T capabilities
and establish a context that will be kept intact during the lifetime of the TLS session. The
context is basically the version of the IF-T protocol to be used. If client side authenti-
cation has not been performed during the TLS handshake the NAA can authenticate the
client during the IF-T Pre-Negotiation phase using IF-T client authentication messages
(see table 3. Finally the IF-T session transitions into IF-T Data Transport phase, where it
remains for the lifetime of the session. [26]
During the Data Transport phase IF-TNCCS messages are exchanged encapsulated in IF-
T messages. Because of the full-duplex nature of the underlying TLS session, either NAA
or NAR may start transmitting an IF-TNCCS message received from its upper layer com-
ponent (TNC Client or TNC Server). The initiator encapsulates the IF-TNCCS message
in an IF-T message, assigns a message identifier to the message, and forwards it to the
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Table 3: IF-T Message Types [26]
Message Type Contents
IFT TYPE EXPERIMENT Reserved for experimental use.
IFT VERSION REQUEST A version negotiation request including the ver-
sions supported by the sender.
IFT VERSION RESPONSE Contains the IF-T version selected by the respon-
der.
IFT CLIENT AUTH REQUEST Contains the authentication methods that the TNC
Server supports and includes a request to choose
an authentication method supported by the TNC
Client.
IFT CLIENT AUTH SELECTION Contains the authentication method chosen by the
TNC Client.
IFT CLIENT AUTH CHALLENGE Contains the authentication challenge sent by the
TNC Server to the TNC Client.
IFT CLIENT AUTH RESPONSE Contains the client’s response to the authentica-
tion challenge.
IFT CLIENT AUTH SUCCESS Indicates that the client was authenticated suc-
cessfully.
IFT TNCCS 20 BATCH Contains an IF-TNCCS 2.0 message.
IFT TNCCS SOH 10 BATCH Contains an IF-TNCCS 1.0 message.
IFT TNCCS XML 10 BATCH Contains an XML-based IF-TNCCS message.
IFT ERROR Contains an IF-T Error Message.
IFT NON TNC DATA Contains non-TNC standard application data.
This can be used by applications that share the
same TLS session but do not want to define a
vendor-specific message type to identify the mes-
sage.
responder. The responder decouples the IF-TNCCS message and forwards it to its upper
layer component. [26]
Figure 14 depicts the three phases of an IF-T session and the message exchange that
occurs within each phase.
2.5.5 Policy Enforcement Point Interface (IF-PEP)
IF-PEP protocol is used for sending network access decisions from the NAA to the PEP
as depicted in Figure 15. This occurs after the endpoint integrity has been assessed and
the NAA has decided the level of access granted to the AR. The access decision triggers
an action on the PEP, either to grant full access for the endpoint or to isolate the endpoint.
There are two possible types of isolation: no access and limited access. The limited access
can be used to provide remediation services for the endpoint. [29]
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Figure 14: IF-T session phases
IF-PEP defines three isolation methods: binary-based, VLAN-based and filter-based iso-
lation. Binary-based isolation is the simplest isolation technique in which the endpoint is
either granted full access or it is completely blocked from the network. Binary-based iso-
lation is straightforward to implement but it doesn’t support remediation of non-compliant
endpoints. In Local Area Networks (LANs) that support IEEE 802.1Q [30] and 802.1D
[31], virtual LANs (VLANs) can be used to provide isolation. VLANs allow network
operators to divide physical Ethernet-based network into multiple logical networks and it
is a technique originally used for improving network performance and scalability. Later
it has been widely adopted also as a network security mechanism providing higher level
of security between network segments within a physical network. In 802.1Q each Ether-
net frame is tagged with a VLAN identifier, or tag, which identifies the logical network
in which the frame belongs to. In VLAN-based isolation The PEP (an 802.1Q-capable
switch) assigns tag for the endpoint’s traffic based on the network access decision made
by the NAA. This allows defining different levels of access. For example, non-compliant
endpoints may be isolated into a logical network (VLAN) that contains only necessary
services to provide remediation for the endpoint. [29]
In filter-based isolation the network traffic of the AR is filtered by the PEP using Access
Control Lists (ACLs). The ACLs consist of Access Control Entities (ACEs) each of which
defines either a permit or deny rule for a service. The PEP evaluates an incoming packet
against the ACLs to either allow or block the packet. In filter-based isolation the ACLs
are generated based on the integrity state of the endpoint. This allows a granular way of
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Figure 15: The IF-PEP
isolating the endpoint as it can be allowed to communicate only with specific IP addresses
and TCP ports. It allows also isolation from other isolated endpoints even if they reside
on the same IP subnet, which is not possible to achieve using VLAN-based isolation. [29]
Using RADIUS as IF-PEP protocol is depicted in Figure 16. Implementation of the
isolation techniques described earlier is quite straightforward using RADIUS. Binary-
based isolation is natively supported by RADIUS by using the ACCESS-ACCEPT and
ACCESS-REJECT messages [16]. The NAA responds to the PEP with an ACCESS-
ACCEPT message when the endpoint should be given access, and with an ACCESS-
REJECT when the endpoint should be blocked. For example, if the outcome of the as-
sessment is that the AR is not compliant with the integrity requirements the NAA may
prevent it accessing the network by responding to the PEP with an ACCESS-REJECT
message. And similarly, if the AR is compliant the NAA responds with an ACCESS-
ACCEPT message. [29]
There are a few options to provide VLAN-based isolation using RADIUS depending
whether tagged or untagged VLANs are being used. When tagged VLANs are used the
logical networks are differentiated using 802.1Q tags which allows multiple network in-
terfaces (i.e., switch port) to belong to multiple VLANs. Untagged VLANs are physically
separated which means that each port belongs to only one untagged VLAN. RADIUS
VLAN attributes [32] can be used for providing VLAN-based isolation for both tagged
and untagged VLANs. Isolation for untagged VLANs can be also implemented using
RADIUS tunnel attributes [34] as described in [33]. [29]
Filter-based isolation can also be implemented using existing attributes within RADIUS
protocol. RADIUS specification [16] contains a Filter-Id attribute that the NAA can use
to provide named filters for the PEP.
Handshake Retry is an important function of the remediation process in the TNC architec-
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Figure 16: Network-Based PEP in TNC Architecture
ture. When the endpoint has remediated itself after first being isolated, Handshake Retry
allows it to get re-evaluated against the security policy. RADIUS has been extended with
dynamic authorization extensions that include two messages needed to implement Hand-
shake Retry: Disconnect and Change-of-Authorization (CoA) [35]. At any time the NAA
may send a Disconnect message to the PEP to cause immediate termination of the session,
or to update the access policy by sending a CoA message including the necessary VLAN
attributes. [29]
2.5.6 Metadata Access Protocol (IF-MAP)
A Metadata Access Point (MAP) is a TNC element that stores state information about
users, devices and flows in a network. This information includes client address bindings
and integrity and authentication status. MAP Clients (MAPCs) may publish information
to a MAP Server, search information on a MAP Server and subscribe for notifications
when the information on the MAP Server changes. So a single MAP Client may publish,
search and subscribe. Often, however, a MAP Client is either a publisher or subscriber.
For example, a TNC Server publishes integrity status information about the clients to
a MAP Server, and a Flow Controller (e.g., a firewall) subscribe to this information so
that they can use it to allow or block traffic flows by clients. If the integrity state of a
client changes, the TNCS updates this information to the MAP Server. The MAP Server
notifies the Flow Controllers of the compliancy change so that and the Flow Controller
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can update its access rules. In this example the TNC Server and the Flow Controller are
MAP Clients. The TNC Server is a publisher, and the Flow Controller is a subscriber.
The relation between MAP Clients and MAP Server is depicted in Figure 17. [36]
Figure 17: The IF-MAP
IF-MAP is the protocol used between MAP Clients and MAP Servers. IF-MAP supports
the following use cases:
• A PDP publishes AR authentication, VLAN and other status information to a MAP.
• A TNC Server publishes integrity status of an AR to a MAP.
• A DHCP server publishes address and lease information associated with an AR.
• A Flow Controller detects a traffic flow from an AR and queries a MAP Server to
find out the integrity and authentication status of the AR to decide whether to allow
or block the traffic flow.
• A Flow Controller subscribes to notifications from a MAP Server about changes in
client state information so that it can make appropriate enforcement adjustments to
existing flows.
• A Sensor (e.g., an Intrusion Detection System) publishes information related to an
AR (e.g., vulnerability detection) to a MAP Server.
• A PDP queries a MAP Server for metadata that a MAP Client has associated with an
AR (e.g., vulnerability information). The PDP uses the metadata to make the access
decisions. The PDP subscribes for notifications about changes in AR metadata so
that it can adjust the access decisions as necessary. [36]
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All IF-MAP operations and data types are represented using Extensible Markup Language
(XML). IF-MAP contains two types of data: identifier and metadata. Identifier is a single,
globally unique value within a range of values defined in the IF-MAP XML schema.
For example, the ip-address identifier type schema element defines an identifier range
consisting of all possible IP addresses. Relationships between identifiers are described
using links. IF-MAP defines link as a bi-directional binding between two identifiers. For
example, a DHCP server might create a link between a MAC address identifier and an IP
address identifier. Table 4 lists the standard identifiers of IF-MAP. [36]
Table 4: IF-MAP Standard Identifiers [36]
Identifier Description
AccessRequestType A request for access to a network by an endpoint.
DeviceType A physical or virtual device attempting to access the network.
IdentityType An end-user accessing the network.
IPAddressType IPv4 or IPv6 address
MACAddressType Ethernet MAC address
IF-MAP metadata is represented as typed values which are defined in the schema. Meta-
data is always associated with a particular identifier or link. There are two types of meta-
data: standard and vendor-specific. Standard metadata is defined in [36] and vendor-
specific metadata is used when the standard is not applicable. Table 5 lists the standard
metadata types. [36]
Table 5: IF-MAP Standard Metadata types [36]
Metadata type Description
access-request-device Associates a device with an access request.
access-request-ip Associates an access request with an IP address.
access-request-mac Associates an access request with a MAC address.
authentication-as Associates an end-user with a specific access request.
authenticated-by Connects an access-request with an ip-address of a PDP or other
authentication server.
capability Refers to a collection of privileges assigned to an endpoint.
device-attribute Associates a customizable attribute with a device.
event Refers to some activity of interest detected on the network (e.g.,
p2p traffic).
layer2-information Describes layer 2 information (e.g., VLAN) related to a specific
access request.
ip-mac Links an IP address to a MAC address.
role Refers to a collection of privileges assigned to a specific access-
request and identity.
Figure 18 illustrates an example of relationships between IF-MAP identifiers and meta-
data. The ovals represent identifiers and the lines depict the links between them. The rect-
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angles represent the metadata elements that can be related to either links or identifiers. As
the picture shows some of the metadata types (e.g., authenticated-as) are so-called sim-
ple metadata types that do not have any content whereas others can contain multiple data
elements (e.g., layer2-information).
Figure 18: An example of IF-MAP metadata and identifier relationships [36]
IF-MAP is a half-duplex protocol. The message exchange between a MAP Client and a
MAP Server involves the client sending a request to the server, and the server sending
a response to the client. There are five types of request messages defined in IF-MAP:
publish, search, subscribe, poll and purgePublisher. Publish requests are used for creating,
updating and deleting metadata associated with one or more identifiers or links. Publish
requests are for publishing metadata only as links and identifiers are conceptually never
created or destroyed. [36]
Search requests are used for retrieving metadata from the MAP Server. The MAP Server
responds with an XML document comprised of resulting identifiers and links along with
the metadata associated with them. A MAP Client can send a subscribe request to sub-
scribe for notifications when the metadata on the MAP Server is updated. Poll requests
are used by the MAP Clients to request notification of metadata updates based on the
client’s subscription. Finally purgePublisher is used for removing all metadata associated
with a particular publisher, typically used by a MAP Client to purge its own data after a
system reset. [36]
Because IF-MAP is essentially a protocol to transport XML documents it is very conve-
nient to use Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [37] for exchanging IF-MAP mes-
sages. SOAP is an XML based protocol for exchanging structured information. SOAP
usually operates on top of other application layer protocols, most notably Hypertext
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Transfer Protocol (HTTP). IF-MAP binding for SOAP is defined in [36].
2.6 Phases in TNC
So far we have examined the different components and interfaces that comprise the TNC
architecture. This section describes on a higher level the three phases that form the net-
work access process in TNC: assessment, remediation and isolation.
During the assessment phase the IMVs validate the integrity measurements provided by
the IMCs. The integrity measurements are evaluated against the security policies defined
by the network operator, and based on this evaluation the IMVs can make one of three
recommendations: allow, isolate or block. In addition the IMVs may send remediation
instructions to the IMCs. Isolation is the phase where due to shortcomings in the integrity
requirements the AR is redirected into a remediation network where it can apply the
necessary changes and updates to comply with the policies. There are a number of tech-
nologies that can be used to provide isolation but currently the TNC architecture supports
VLAN containment and IP filters. After the AR is isolated it has to apply the neces-
sary changes into configurations, install missing security updates, etc. in order to become
compliant with the policies and gain access to the network. The process of applying the
changes is called remediation. [3]
Figure 19: The Provisioning and Remediation Layer in TNC [3]
To provide support for remediation an additional layer of components called Provisioning
and Remediation layer is needed. This layer and its relation to the rest of the TNC ar-
chitecture is depicted in Figure 19. The Provisioning and Remediation layer contains all
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the necessary applications and services to provide remediation. Provisioning and Reme-
diation Application (PRA) is an entity that communicates with the IMCs and provides it
with specific types of integrity information. An example of a PRA could be update agent
software that obtains the latest security updates for an operating system. The PRA could
also be implemented as a part of an IMC. [3]
The second entity within the Provisioning and Remediation layer is the Provisioning and
Remediation Resource (PRR). PRR is a service that provides resources for updating the
AR into compliance. Using the previous example of the update agent software the PRR
would be an update server where the PRA could obtain the security updates. [3]
Figure 20: The TNC Message Flows [3]
Figure 20 presents an example message flow occurring during a TNC access control dia-
log. This example presents only a basic scenario of a TNC message exchange assuming
that no remediation occurs. The first message flows occur already prior establishing a net-
work connection. The TNCC and TNCS must load and initialize the relevant IMCs and
IMVs that are used to measure the integrity state of the endpoint. The NAR initializes
the network access request by establishing a network connection with the PEP. The PEP
sends a network access decision request to the NAA which may perform user authentica-
tion. Assuming that the authentication succeeds the NAA forwards the connection request
to the TNCS. The TNCS may perform (mutual) Platform Credential Authentication (flow
4) with the TNCC to verify that the endpoints are trusted by each other. Assuming that
the authentication succeeds the TNCS informs the IMVs of a new connection request and
similarly the TNCC informs the IMCs that a new Integrity Check Handshake is going to
be carried out. After that the TNCC and TNCS start exchanging messages pertaining to
the integrity handshake (flow 6A). The IMCs send the messages containing integrity in-
formation to the TNCC which forwards the messages to the TNCS and subsequently to the
IMVs. The IMVs validate the measurements and either respond to the IMCs or provide
a recommendation for the TNCS (flow 6B). Finally after the Integrity Check Handshake
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has completed the TNCS sends its TNCS Action Recommendation to the NAA which
consequently indicates its access decision to the PEP. [3]
2.7 TNC and the Trusted Platform Module
In addition to the interfaces and protocols described earlier the TNC architecture extends
to the usage of hardware protected identity and integrity information. This extension
allows a device to communicate platform proof-of-identity (Platform Credential Authen-
tication) and platform integrity information (Integrity Check Handshake) as part of an au-
thentication process to an authentication server (PDP). The chain of trust is built bottom-
up, and the basis is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [27] hardware bound to the
device. [3]
Trusted Platform Module is a security device that allows storing cryptographic keys and
provides such functionalities as remote attestation and sealed storage. Remote attestation
can be used for detecting changes on the hardware and software configuration of the
platform. This is achieved by generating a certificate from the current hardware and
software configuration. Sealed storage can be used for protecting private information by
binding it to the platform. This means that the information can be obtained by using the
same combination of hardware and software configurations. This is a feature utilized by
hard drive encryption software to allow only the trusted platform to decrypt the data on
the hard drive. At the time of manufacture a random encryption key called endorsement
key (EK) is embedded within the TPM chip. The EK is a public/private key pair that can
be used to identify the platform. The private portion of the key is never released from the
TPM. [27]
Figure 21 illustrates how the TNC architecture can be extended with Platform Authen-
tication using the TPM. The TPM provides four functionalities that are needed for the
Platform Authentication: protected capabilities, integrity measurement and storage, in-
tegrity reporting and attestations. Protected capabilities refer to a set of commands that
have exclusive access to shielded locations (e.g., a protected memory space) where it
is safe to process sensitive data. Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) on the TPM
can be used to store integrity measurements and optionally cryptographic keys used for
authentication during the Integrity Check Handshake. [3]
After the integrity measurement process the measurements are stored in an integrity log
and digests of the measurements are stored in PCRs to detect any corruption of the data.
The measurements are then combined into an integrity report which is signed with a
private key and sent to the verifier. Finally, attestation is the process certifying for the
accuracy of information, so that the relying party can use the attestation to decide whether
it trusts the platform. [3]
The Platform Authentication introduces a new layer on the TNC architecture: Platform
Trust Services (PTS) as depicted in Figure 21. PTS provides an abstraction layer for the
TNC Client and IMCs that access the protected capabilities within the TPM. The TPM is
accessed using the TCG Software Stack (TSS) [38] which is a standard Application Pro-
gramming Interace (API) for accessing the functions of the TPM. The PTS functionality
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Figure 21: The TNC architecture with the Trusted Platform Module [3]
is provided to upper layer components using Platform Trust Services Interface (IF-PTS).
IF-PTS is not yet standardized but the TNC-WG is planning to standardize it in the future.
[3]
Platform ownership is an important concept in context of TNC and Platform Authenti-
cation. A common situation is that the PDP and PEP is owned by the same party (e.g.,
network operator or IT department). The AR may or may not have the same owner but in
context of Platform Authentication this ownership should be re-evaluated. If the owners
are different both parties have to trust to a third party called Privacy Certificate Author-
ity (Privacy CA) in order to successfully carry out Platform Authentication and remote
attestation. The Privacy CA issues Attestation Identity Key (AIK) certificate for trusted
platforms. The trusted platforms are authenticated using the endorsement key of the TPM.
If the PDP trusts the same Privacy CA the AR can use the AIK to authenticate to the PDP.
[3]
2.8 Federated TNC
So far we have presented an architecture that enables network operators to enforce secu-
rity policies regarding endpoint posture. However, this model assumes that the endpoint
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and the TNC Server belong to the same security domain, i.e. have a direct trust relation-
ship with each other. Federated TNC extends the integrity verification to cover multiple
organizations or security domains. It defines a new protocol called Federated TNC pro-
tocol (IF-FTNC) which enables communication of IF-M attributes, IF-TNCCS Action
Recommendations and IF-MAP metadata between security domains that have a trust re-
lationship with each other. When two or more security domains share a trust relationship
they are referred as federated. The role of federated TNC is depicted in Figure 22. [39].
Figure 22: Federated TNC [39]
The conceptual model of Federated TNC distinguishes three actors: the endpoint (TNC
Client), the Asserting Security Domain (ASD) and the Relying Security Domain (RSD).
ASD is the domain that has knowledge of the endpoint’s Security Posture Information
(SPI). RSD is the domain where the endpoint is requesting access to. When the endpoint
requests access at the RSD the RSD requests the endpoint’s SPI from the ASD, which in
turn assesses the endpoint’s posture. The three parties and their relationships with each
other is depicted in Figure 23. [39]
Currently the IF-FTNC defines two supported use case profiles: Roaming Assessment
Profile and Web Assessment Profile. The Roaming Assessment Profile enables organiza-
tions with roaming agreements to use integrity-based authorization for roaming clients.
It allows the host network (the RSD) to request the endpoint’s SPI from the endpoint’s
home network (the ASD). The use of Roaming Assessment Profile is illustrated in Figure
24. [39]
The TNC is often considered as a network access control mechanism used when the end-
point is connecting the network. However after the network connection is successfully
established the endpoint may interact with network web resources that aren’t within the
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Figure 23: The parties in the Federated TNC [39]
same security domain. The service providers for these web resources (e.g. partner organi-
zations or software-as-a-service providers) may also be interested of the client’s security
posture. For example, a partner organization might be concerned that if the client’s cre-
dential information will be compromised if the client’s security posture is not solid. Using
Web Assessment Profile the web resource (the RSD) may obtain the client’s SPI from the
client’s home network (the ASD) as illustrated in Figure 25. [39]
Figure 24: The Roaming Assessment Profile [39]
The IF-FTNC protocol is built on Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) which is
an XML-based framework for exchanging authentication and authorization information
between security domains. SAML operates between three key parties: the user, the Iden-
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Figure 25: The Web Assessment Profile [39]
tity Provider (IdP) and the Service Provider (SP). Identity Provider is the party holding
the identity information about the users. Service Provider owns the service or data that
is being accessed by the user. SAML specification defines XML-based assertions, proto-
cols, bindings and profiles. SAML assertion is an XML document that contains security
information about a user. In clmProtocol defines how SAML elements are encapsulated
within request and response elements. Bindings define how the requests and responses
are transferred using existing protocols. Currently there is only one binding which is
SAML over SOAP. Finally, profiles define how SAML assertions, protocols and bindings
combine to support a defined use case. In IF-FTNC the ASD operates a TNCS which
performs authentication and posture assessment functions, as well as a SAML attribute
authority which can respond to queries for SAML assertions. The RSD operates a SAML
Service Provider and requester, which obtains assertions from the attribute authority. [40]
[39]
2.9 Summary
This chapter described the architecture of Trusted Network Connect which is a framework
that provides endpoint integrity verification as a network access control mechanism. The
TNC architecture is comprised of entities, components and interfaces. The fundamen-
tal entities in the architecture are the Access Requestor (AR), Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP). AR is the client seeking access to the network.
PDP makes the access decision based on the integrity information provided by the AR
during the assessment process. PEP enforces the access decision made by the PDP by
granting or restricting access to the network. The authorization process is comprised of
three phases: assessment, isolation and remediation. During the assessment phase the
PDP verifies the integrity of the AR. Isolation is the process of restricting access of non-
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compliant clients, and during remediation the non-compliant clients are brought compli-
ant. TNC utilizes existing protocols for communication between the components. These
protocols include Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), Transport Layer Security
(TLS), Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) and IEEE 802.1X.
In addition to the basic entities the TNC also supports Metadata Access Point (MAP)
and Flow Controllers and Sensors for storing metadata of the clients in the network and
using this information to protect the network. TNC also integrates with Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) to provide hardware-based authentication and integrity protection, and
provides integrity assessment over multiple security domains using federated TNC.
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3 Commercial implementations of NAC-EI
This chapter describes in detail Microsoft Network Access Protection (NAP) as a com-
mercial implementation of NAC-EI. At first we describe the architecture behind the NAP
and in the last section we compare NAP with TNC and try to find out similarities and
differences between the open standard architecture and the commercial implementation.
3.1 Introduction
Network Access Protection (NAP) is a collection of operating system components to pro-
vide system health state validation as a basis for network access decisions. NAP allows
the network operator to define security policies to determine whether a client accessing
the network is compliant. Non-compliant clients can be provided with limited access to
the network until the health policy requirements have been met. NAP has been an integral
part of Windows operating systems since Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Also
Windows XP Service Pack 3 supports NAP. [41]
Figure 26: NAP Components [41]
NAP architecture provides the following functionalities to support network access control
based on endpoint health state: health state validation, network access limitation, auto-
matic remediation and ongoing compliance. Health state validation is the process of deter-
mining whether the client computer is compliant with the health policy requirements. Net-
work access limitation provides limited access to the network for non-compliant clients.
Automatic remediation enables non-compliant clients to become compliant without user
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intervention. And finally, ongoing compliance is the process of automatically updating
clients so that they remain compliant even if the health policy requirements change. [41]
3.2 NAP Components
Figure 26 describes the different components within the NAP architecture. NAP Client
is the client computer seeking access to the network. NAP Health Policy Servers store
health requirement policies and provide health state validation services. The component
in Windows Server 2008 acting as NAP Health Policy Server is Network Policy Server
(NPS). NPS can also act as an AAA server. The actual identity information is stored in
Active Directory (AD) which is a directory service providing authentication and autho-
rization services. [41]
Health Policy Servers communicate with Health Requirement Servers to obtain latest
health requirements. For example, a Health Requirement Server for an anti-virus program
would probably keep track on the latest anti-virus signature files. The actual enforce-
ment of NAP health requirement policies is done by NAP Enforcement Points. Figure
26 presents some examples of NAP enforcement including DHCP server, IEEE 802.1X
devices and VPN server. NAP Enforcement Points use the help of NAP Health Policy
Server to evaluate the health state of the clients. Non-compliant clients are restricted into
a restricted network containing remediation servers that provide necessary services and
resources to bring non-compliant clients into compliant. Compliant clients are provided
with a certificate by Health Registration Authority (HRA) which obtains the certificates
from a Certification Authority (CA). [41]
Figure 27: Communcation between NAP components [41]
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3.3 NAP Client Architecture
Figure 28 describes the different components within a NAP Client. NAP Client is a
computer running a Windows operating system supporting NAP functionality. The NAP
Client platform consists of three kinds of components: System Health Agent (SHA) com-
ponents, NAP Enforcement Client (EC) components and a NAP Agent component. SHA
is a component that maintains and reports some piece of system health information. Ex-
amples of System Health Agents include software components that check the status of
anti-virus signatures or operating system updates. Windows operating system provides
SHAs for measuring the system health on a high level but vendors are expected to de-
velop SHAs for measuring and reporting vendor-specific health information. SHAs can
also have a corresponding remediation server. Using the previous examples, the SHAs
could communicate with remediation servers providing latest anti-virus signatures or op-
erating system updates. [41]
Figure 28: NAP client architecture [41]
The NAP Client uses NAP Enforcement Clients to communicate with NAP Enforcement
Points. Each network access technology should have its own NAP EC, e.g., one NAP EC
to communicate with DHCP servers, another to communicate with IEEE 802.1X devices.
Third-party vendors may provide their own NAP ECs. [41]
NAP Agent is the component that maintains the system health information of the NAP
Client and facilitates communication between NAP ECs and SHAs. NAP Agent com-
municates with the SHAs and NAP ECs using SHA API and NAP EC API. SHA API is
an interface that allows SHAs to register with the NAP Agent, to provide system health
status, to respond to requests for system health status and for the NAP Agent to pass re-
mediation instructions to the SHAs. Similarly, the NAP EC API allows the NAP ECs to
register with the NAP Agent and to pass information received from the NAP Enforcement
Point to the NAP Agent. [41]
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To report the health status an SHA generates a Statement of Health (SoH) and passes it to
the NAP Agent. An SoH can contain one or more elements of system health information.
Each time an SHA updates its status it generates a new SoH and forwards it to the NAP
Agent. The NAP Agent aggregates all the SoH elements into a System Statement of
Health (SSoH) which represents the overall health status of the NAP Client. The NAP
Agent passes the SSoH to a NAP EC which forwards it to the NAP Enforcement Point.
[41]
3.4 NAP Server Architecture
Figure 29: NAP Server architecture [41]
As illustrated in Figure 29 the NAP server-side architecture consists of two entities: NAP
Health Policy Server and NAP Enforcement Point. NAP Health Policy Server consists
of three kinds of components: System Health Validators (SHVs), a NAP Administration
Server and an NPS service. SHV is a component that is responsible of validating the
integrity of a specific piece of system information. Each SHV communicates with a cor-
responding SHA on the client side. An SHV may also communicate with one or more
Health Requirement Servers to obtain system health requirements. However this is not
mandatory. An example of an SHV that doesn’t need to communicate with a Health Re-
quirement Server is an SHV that checks that a client firewall software is enabled on the
NAP Client. [41]
NPS Service is an implementation of RADIUS server that receives the RADIUS Access-
Request message, extracts the SSoH sent by the NAP Client and forwards it to NAP
Administration Server. The NAP Administration Server is the component that facilitates
communication between the NPS Service and the SHVs as illustrated in Figure 30. It re-
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ceives the SSoH from the NPS Service, disaggregates the SoHs from the SSoH and passes
the SoHs to the corresponding SHVs. When an SHV receives a Statement of Health (SoH)
from the NAP Administration Server it compares the system health status in the SoH with
the required system health state. After the validation the SHV generates a Statement of
Health Response (SoHR) and passes it to the NAP Administration Server. The SoHR
indicates whether the health requirements were met by the SoH and optionally remedia-
tion instructions. For example, the SoHR might include the IP address of a remediation
server holding the latest anti-virus signature files. The NAP Administration Server in turn
generates a System Statement of Health Response (SSoHR) by combining all the SoHs
received from the SHVs. [41]
Figure 30: Message exchange between NAP Client and Server components [41]
NAP Enforcement Point is the entity that enforces the network access decisions made by
the Health Policy Server. The Enforcement Point contains one or more NAP Enforce-
ment Server (NAP ES) components, each of which implements some network access
technology. Windows Server 2008 provides three built-in NAP ESs: NAP ES for IPsec
communications, NAP ES for DHCP and NAP ES for Terminal Server (TS) Gateway
connections. [41]
3.5 NAP Enforcement Methods
The NAP network access process can be divided into four phases: system health status re-
porting, network policy compliance verification, network access limitation and automatic
remediation. During system health status reporting the NAP Client provides an SSoH for
the Health Policy Server. During the network policy compliance verification the Health
Policy Server validates the SSoH against the health policy requirements. Network access
limitation is the process of isolating a noncompliant client into a restricted network, and
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bringing the client compliant without user interaction is called automatic remediation.
This section describes how these functionalities can be provided using IPsec-protected
communication, 801.1X-based authorization, VPN connections and DHCP addressing.
[41]
3.5.1 IPsec Enforcement
Figure 31: NAP IPsec enforcement [41]
NAP can be used in conjunction with IP Security Architecture (IPsec) to provide NAP
enforcement. As opposed to VPN or 802.1X enforcement the IPsec enforcement is im-
plemented by each individual network node, rather than at the edge of the network. The
enforcement is based on the health certificates that are assigned for each compliant client
during the compliance assessment. Using IPsec allows the enforcement to be limited for
specific clients on a subnet or specific TCP or UDP ports assuming that there is an in-
frastructure in place to distribute IPsec policies (e.g., Active Directory Group Policies).
[41]
IPsec enforcement divides the network into three logical partitions: secure network, bound-
ary network and restricted network. This classification is illustrated in Figure 31. The
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secure network contains the clients that are classified as healthy, i.e. possess health certifi-
cates. All clients in secure network require the use of health certificates for authenticating
incoming IPsec traffic. They may communicate to clients in all networks but will ac-
cept only authenticated incoming connections from the secure network and the boundary
network. [42]
The boundary network contains the computers that hold health certificates but do not
require the use of health certificates for IPsec authentication. Clients in the boundary
network require authentication for connections initiated from secure network or boundary
network. Connections initiated from the restricted network do not require authentication.
The boundary network typically consists of the HRA and NAP Remediation Servers. This
is because the HRA and the NAP Remediation Servers need to communicate with both
compliant and non-compliant clients. [42]
Figure 32: NAP IPsec message flow
Figure 32 describes the message flow that occurs when a NAP Client obtains a health
certificate. The process begins when the client connects to the network and obtains an
IP address configuration. At this point the client does not have a health certificate so it
is placed in the restricted network. It can communicate only with computers within the
restricted and boundary networks. The NAP Agent obtains the SoHs from the SHAs. This
can actually occur before the client connects to the network which is the reason that it is
described with message flow 0 in the figure. The NAP Agent combines the SoHs into a
System Statement of Health (SSoH) and forwards it to the NAP EC. The NAP EC initiates
an HTTP or HTTPS session with the HRA and uses this session to pass the SSoH to the
HRA. The HRA extracts the SSoH from the HTTP or HTTPS message and passes it to
the NPS service as a RADIUS Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA) in a RADIUS Access-
Request message. The NPS service on the NAP Health Policy Server receives the Access-
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Request message, extracts the SSoH from the RADIUS VSA and forwards it to the NAP
Administration Server. The NAP Administration Server segregates the SoHs from the
SSoH and passes each SoH to the corresponding SHV. The SHVs evaluate the SoHs
against the system health requirements and generate SoHRs on the basis of this evaluation.
The NAP Administration Server receives the SoHRs from the SHVs and passes them to
the NPS service. The NPS service evaluates the SoHRs against the configured set of health
policy requirements and generates the SSoHR. The NPS service encapsulates the SSoHR
into a RADIUS Access-Accept message which indicates whether the client gets restricted
or unrestricted access to the network. The HRA extracts the SSoHR from the RADIUS
message and passes it to the NAP EC using HTTP or HTTPS. The NAP EC forwards
the SSoHR to the NAP Agent which forwards the individual SoHRs to the SHAs. If
the NAP Client is compliant the HRA obtains a health certificate from the Certificate
Authority (CA) and issues it to the client. The client stores the certificate into its local
certificate store and configures its IPsec policies to use this certificate to authenticate
IPsec connections. At this point the client is located in the secure network. If the client
is not compliant with the health policy requirements the SHAs perform the necessary
remediation actions to bring the client compliant. After the remediation is completed the
SHAs send the updated SoHs to the NAP Agent which initiates a new assessment process
identical to the one depicted in Figure 32. This process continues iteratively until the
client is evaluated as compliant and issued a health certificate. [42]
3.5.2 IEEE 802.1X Enforcement
In IEEE 802.1X enforcement an 802.1X-capable device is acting as NAP Enforcement
Point. The isolation is based on either VLAN tagging or IP filtering. In VLAN tagging the
client traffic is distinguished into separate Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) using
VLAN IDs. In IP filtering the 802.1X-capable device applies IP filters to the client traffic
allowing only access to resources according to the Access Control List (ACL) defined in
the filter. [41]
Figure 33 illustrates the message flow between the different NAP client and server compo-
nents when IEEE 802.1X enforcement is used. The assessment process starts when either
the 802.1X client or the 802.1X-capable network device (e.g., switch) initiates 802.1X au-
thentication using EAP over LAN (EAPOL) protocol. During the authentication the NPS
service, which is acting as RADIUS authentication server, sends an EAP-Request/Identity
message to the EAPHost NAP EC which responds with an EAP-Response/Identity mes-
sage containing the user or computer name of the client. After that the NPS service sends
an EAP-Request/Start PEAP message to initiate a Protected EAP (PEAP) conversation.
PEAP is an authentication protocol developed for environments where physical security
of the network cannot be guaranteed (e.g., wireless networks) and it works by initially
negotiating a TLS session and then conducting EAP conversation within it [43]. [41]
The NAP Client and Health Policy Server negotiate a protected TLS session. The message
exchange occurs logically between the NPS service and the NAP EC while the 802.1X-
capable network device is acting as a pass-through device. The message exchange be-
tween the NPS service and the 802.1X-compliant device is conducted using RADIUS
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Figure 33: NAP message flow with IEEE 802.1X enforcement
Access-Request, Access-Accept and Access-Challenge messages. After the TLS session
has been established the NPS service sends a PEAP-TLV message containing a request for
the SSoH of the NAP Client. The NAP EC queries the NAP Agent for the SSoH and the
NAP Agent responses with the SSoH aggregated from the SoHs received from the SHAs.
The NAP EC forwards the SSoH to the NPS service. At this point the NPS service sends a
request to the NAP Client to authenticate itself using either computer or user credentials.
The authentication is performed using one the PEAP authentication methods, e.g., PEAP-
Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol version 2 (MS-CHAP v2). After
the authentication the NPS service extracts the SSoH from the PEAP-TLV message and
passes it to the NAP Administration Server which then forwards each SoH to the corre-
sponding SHVs. The SHVs validate the SoHs and respond with SoHR generated based
on the validation. The NAP Administration Server passes the SoHRs to the NPS ser-
vice which compares the SoHRs against the defined set of health policy requirements and
based on this comparison generates a SSoHR. The NPS service sends a PEAP-TLV mes-
sage containing the SSoHR to the NAP EC and a RADIUS Access-Accept message to the
802.1X device. If the NAP Client is considered non-compliant the Access-Accept mes-
sage contains an access profile to limit the traffic from the NAP Client to the restricted
network. If the client is considered compliant the message does not contain an access
profile and the client will be provided unrestricted access to the network. The NAP EC
extracts the SSoHR from the PEAP-TLV message, passes it to NAP Agent which in turn
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forwards each SoHR to the corresponding SHAs. Each SHA analyze the contents of the
SoHRs and, if necessary, perform the necessary remediation steps. After the remediation
the SHAs send the updated SoHs to the NAP Agent. The NAP Agent generates an up-
dated SSoH and passes it to the NAP EC which initiates a new 802.1X authentication and
system health validation. [41]
3.5.3 DHCP Enforcement
Figure 34: NAP message flow with DHCP configuration
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a network protocol used for deliver-
ing host-specific network configuration information on a TCP/IP network. DHCP uses a
client-server where client is the host seeking for configuration parameters and server is
the host that allocates network addresses and delivers configuration parameters to clients.
The parameters contain such information as the addresses of the Domain Name System
(DNS) servers, and the default gateway and subnet mask of the network [44]. The DHCP
configuration initiates when the client connects to the network and sends a DHCPDis-
cover message which is a broadcast message sent to discover the available DHCP servers
on the network. The DHCP server responds to the client with a DHCPOffer message
that contains the configuration parameters configured on the server. After the client has
received the offer it sends a DHCPRequest to request for an address lease from the DHCP
server. Finally, the server sends a DHCPAck to confirm the address lease. [45]
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DHCP can be used to provide NAP enforcement. In this case the DHCP server is acting
as NAP Enforcement Point. The DHCP enforcement works so that the DHCP server
provides valid network configuration parameters only to clients that meet the health policy
requirements. Non-compliant clients are provided with DHCP Router value 0.0.0.0 which
means that the clients do not have a default gateway. Traffic to same subnet is restricted by
assigning subnet mask of 255.255.255.255 which means that the client routes all traffic to
the default gateway, which in this case is not configured. To enable access to remediation
servers the DHCP server utilizes the Static Route Option [44] to provide routes in the
restricted network. There are a couple of limitations with DHCP enforcement. The first
limitation is that it is restricted to IPv4, so it cannot be used with IPv6. The second
limitation is that even though the client is provided with limited network configuration
parameters, a malicious user with administrative permissions on the client may alter the
network configuration to gain full access to network. [41]
The message flow during NAP DHCP enforcement is illustrated in Figure 34. When the
NAP Client connects to the network the DHCP NAP EC within the NAP Client queries the
NAP Agent for a SSoH. The NAP Agent generates a SSoH from the SoHs received from
the SHAs and passes it to the DHCP NAP EC. The DHCP NAP EC creates a DHCPDis-
cover message containing the SSoH as a Microsoft vendor-specific DHCP option and
sends it to the DHCP NAP ES component on the NAP-enabled DHCP Server. The DHCP
NAP ES extracts the SSoH from the DHCPDiscover message and sends it to the NPS
service within a RADIUS Access-Request message. The NPS service on the NAP Health
Policy Server extracts the SSoH from the Access-Request message and forwards it to
NAP Administration Server. The NAP Administration Server forwards each SoH from
the SSoH to the corresponding SHVs which validate the SoHs and respond with a SoHR.
The NAP Administration Server compares the SoHRs against the health policy require-
ments, generates a SSoHR and passes it to the NPS service. The NPS service creates a
RADIUS Access-Accept message containing the SSoHR and sends it to the DHCP server.
The DHCP server determines from the Access-Accept message whether the client is com-
pliant and sends a DHCPOffer to the client containing the IP configuration parameters
and the SSoHR as a vendor-specific option. The client sends a DHCPRequest message
requesting the offered IP configuration parameters and the DHCP server responds with
a DHCPAck. The DHCP NAP EC within the NAP Client extracts the SSoHR from the
DHCPOffer and forwards it to the NAP Agent which subsequently forwards each SoHR
to the corresponding SHAs. If the NAP Client is considered compliant the IP address
configuration offered with the DHCPOffer and DHCPAck contains an IP address for the
client, a subnet mask for the subnet to which the client belongs and a DHCP Router option
with the value of the default gateway of the subnet. At this point the client has unlimited
network access. [41]
If the client is not compliant, the default gateway value is set to 0.0.0.0 and the subnet
mask to 255.255.255.255. In addition, the DHCPOffer and DHCPAck include the Static
Route Option consisting of the addresses of the remediation servers. At this point the
SHAs need to communicate with the remediation servers to become compliant. After the
remediation has completed, the SHAs send the updated SoHs to the NAP Agent which
aggregates them into an SSoH. The NAP Agent passes the updated SSoH to the DHCP
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NAP EC which initiates a new DHCP session in order to gain unrestricted access to the
network. [41]
3.5.4 VPN Enforcement
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a logical network implemented on top of an existing
network infrastructure to provide access to a private network over an insecure network,
usually the Internet. VPNs are widely used in organizations to provide remote access
to private resources over the Internet. Because the remote access clients are logically
connected to the internal network it is necessary to be able to apply the same security
policies for remote access clients as for the locally connected clients. NAP provides a
routine for using a VPN server as a NAP Enforcement Point to enforce the same set
of health policy requirements for the remote access clients as for the locally connected
clients. [41]
Figure 35: NAP message flow with VPN enforcement
The message flow during the VPN enforcement is described in Figure 35. The process
initiates when the NAP Client establishes a VPN connection to the VPN server using one
of the remote access protocols provided by the VPN server. Examples of VPN protocols
include Layer Two Tunneling Protocol over IPsec (L2TP/IPsec) [46] and Point-to-Point
Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [47]. During the VPN establishment the VPN server sends an
EAP-Request/Identity message to the VPN NAP EC component within the NAP Client.
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The VPN NAP EC responds with an EAP-Response/Identity containing the user name
of the client. The VPN server passes the EAP-Responde/Identity message to the NPS
service within a RADIUS Access-Request message. After that the NPS service initiates
a PEAP conversation with the VPN NAP EC using the VPN server as a pass-through
device in the same manner as in the IEEE 802.1X enforcement. The NPS service sends
an EAP-Request/Start PEAP message to the VPN NAP EC to establish a protected TLS
session. After that the NPS service sends a request for SSoH to the NAP Client using a
PEAP-TLV message. The VPN NAP EC queries the NAP Agent for the SSoH and the
NAP Agent responds with a SSoH generated from the SoHs. The VPN NAP EC responds
to the NPS service with a PEAP-TLV message containing the SSoH. The NPS service
receives the SSoH and requests that the VPN client authenticate itself using one of the
PEAP authentication methods. After the authentication is completed the NPS service
extracts the SSoH from the PEAP-TLV message and forwards it to the NAP Administra-
tion Server which conveys the SoHs for the corresponding SHVs. the SHVs analyze the
contents of the SoHs and respond with SoHRs. The NAP Administration Server passes
the SoHRs to the NPS service which compares the SoHRs with the defined health policy
requirements. The NPS service then creates an SSoHR, encapsulates it in a PEAP-TLV
message and forwards it to the VPN NAP EC. The NPS service sends a RADIUS Access-
Accept message to the VPN server to enforce IP packet filters. If the client is considered
non-compliant the Access-Accept message contains a set of IP packet filters to limit the
access of the VPN client to the restricted network. If the client is compliant, the Access-
Accept message does not contain any IP filters and the VPN client will gain unrestricted
access to the network. The VPN NAP EC receives the PEAP-TLV message, extracts the
SSoHR from the message and passes it to the NAP Client. The NAP Client forwards each
SoHR to the corresponding SHAs. If the NAP Client is not compliant with the health
policy requirements the SHAs contact the remediation servers to become compliant and
then create updated SoHs to initiate a new assessment process using the existing PEAP
conversation. [41]
3.6 NAP and TNC
So far we have described two different architectures that support network access control
based on endpoint integrity. Trusted Network Connect (TNC) is an open standard devel-
oped by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) which defines a set of vendor-neutral compo-
nents and interfaces to support posture-based network access control. Network Access
Protection (NAP) is a commercial product developed by Microsoft that implements sim-
ilar features than the TNC. In this section we compare these two architectures with each
other and try to find out differences and similarities between them. To compare these
two technologies we must first take a look at the features that the architectures aim at
supporting. The TNC specification identifies the following requirements [3]:
• Platform-Authentication: the verification of the identity (Platform Credential Au-
thentication) and integrity (Integrity Check Handshake) of the platform requesting
access to the network.
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• Endpoint Policy Compliance: establishing a level of trust in the state of the end-
point. Endpoint Policy Compliance can be seen as an authorization mechanism in
which the integrity state of the endpoint is provided as input for the authorization
decision.
• Access Policy: guaranteeing that the client is authenticated and authorized before
connecting to the network.
• Assessment, Isolation and Remediation: ensuring that non-compliant endpoints are
quarantined from the rest of the network and possibly provided with remediation
services to in order to become compliant.
Microsoft NAP provides the following features:
• Health state validation: determining whether the endpoint is compliant with the
predefined set of security policies.
• Network access limitation: restricting access of non-compliant endpoints.
• Automatic remediation: the process of helping the endpoint to become compliant
without user intervention.
• Ongoing compliance: updating compliant endpoints automatically to stay compli-
ant even if the policy requirements change.
If we look at the requirements we can see that there are a lot of similarities but also some
differences. The TNC requirements emphasize the importance of trust which is founded
on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). NAP architecture does not support platform au-
thentication in the same manner. Both architectures recognize the phases of assessment,
isolation and remediation. The client posture is assessed before access to the network
is granted and non-compliant clients are provided with restricted access. The process of
bringing a non-compliant client into compliant, i.e. remediation, is also recognized in the
requirements of both architectures even though NAP emphasizes more the importance of
automatic remediation without user intervention. One of the features of NAP is ongoing
compliance which is not listed in the TNC requirements. However this feature is pro-
vided by the TNC IF-T protocol as described in section 2.5.4. In section 2.8 we discussed
about federated TNC and IF-FTNC protocol that enables to provision TNC over multiple
security domains by using trust relationships. NAP does not currently support integrity
verification over multiple security domains.
If we compare TNC and NAP from a pure architectural point of view we can see that
they share a lot in common. Figure 36 depicts the components and interfaces within both
architectures. The blue rectangles represent the components within the TNC architecture
that do not exist within the NAP architecture. The green rectangles represent the com-
ponents that exist within both architectures and that can be mapped with each other. The
components in the figure are named according to NAP architecture, and the names within
the parentheses represent the corresponding components within the TNC.
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Figure 36: TNC and NAP Architectures
As we can see from Figure 36 all the components that are needed for assessment, isolation
and remediation are very much alike within both of these architectures. Metadata Access
Point and Flow Controllers and Sensors are used for monitoring the network and iden-
tifying changes in the network and these components are not included within the NAP
architecture. The Trusted Platform Module can be used in TNC to provide hardware-
based authentication and integrity verification but this feature is not available in NAP
either. The SHAs perform exactly the same functionality as the IMCs. An IMC collects
integrity information and sends this information to the TNC Client. Equally, an SHA
creates a Statement of Health based on the gathered integrity measurements and passes
it to the NAP Agent. The role of the TNC Client and NAP Agent is to aggregate the in-
tegrity measurements and exchange messages with the server side. The NAP Agent loads
the SHAs using the SHA API whereas the TNC Client loads the IMCs using IF-IMC.
NAP Enforcement Clients are equivalent to the Network Access Requestors in the TNC.
A NAP EC establishes network connection with the NAP Enforcement Point. Just as with
NARs, there may be multiple NAP ECs within the NAP Client to support different kinds
of network access mechanisms. NAP Enforcement Point is the component that applies the
network access decision made by the NPS service. The equivalent in the TNC is the Pol-
icy Enforcement Point, which enforces the network access decision made by the Network
Access Authority. Just like the NPS service, NAA is often considered to be a RADIUS
Authentication Server. The NAA or the NPS service makes the access decision based
on the information that it gets from the TNC Server or NAP Administration Server. The
role of the TNC Server is to facilitate communication between the IMVs and the NAA. It
loads the IMVs, aggregates the data collected from the IMVs and passes it to the NAA.
The role of the NAP Administration Server is equivalent.
RADIUS protocol plays a key role in both TNC and NAP architectures. It is convenient as
RADIUS provides authentication and authorization capabilities, and as we discussed, the
endpoint compliance verification can be seen as an authorization mechanism where the
endpoint posture is used as input for the authorization decision. In the previous section we
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discovered that NAP supports currently four policy enforcement methods: IEEE 802.1X,
DHCP, IPsec, VPN and DHCP. TNC supports currently IEEE 802.1X-based enforcement
and VPN-based enforcement as discussed in section 2.5.4.
Figure 37: Interoperability between TNC and NAP [48]
As we saw in the previous paragraphs the high-level architecture of the Microsoft NAP
is very similar to the TNC architecture. Of course the reason is that Microsoft has been
closely involved in the TNC Work Group with other major network companies, such as
Juniper. In May 2007 Microsoft and TCG announced that they will provide interoperabil-
ity between TNC and NAP architectures. The first step was that Microsoft contributed
its Statement of Health (SoH) protocol to the TNC Work Group. The TNC-WG pub-
lished IF-TNCCS bindings for Microsoft SoH protocol (IF-TNCCS-SOH) which is an
open standard protocol that provides interoperability between TNC and NAP components
[13]. Figure 37 illustrates the interoperability between NAP- and TNC-compatible com-
ponents. The endpoint might be a TNC Client or a NAP Client, and the Policy Decision
Point might be either a TNC or NAP Server. The protocol that enables the interoperability
is the IF-TNCCS-SOH which is supported by both TNC and NAP. The Policy Enforce-
ment Point does not need to understand IF-TNCCS-SOH as it just relays the messages
between the endpoint and the PDP. [48]
Figure 38 summarizes the differences and similarities between the open standard TNC ar-
chitecture and Microsoft NAP architecture. The dark blue rectangle illustrates the features
and functionalities of the TNC architecture whereas the light blue rectangle represents the
NAP architecture. As the figure illustrates both architectures share a lot in common which
enables interoperability between these architectures as discussed previously. The TNC
architecture is more extensive as it provides also support for federation and monitoring
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capabilities which are features not implemented in NAP. NAP implements some isolation
technologies that are not supported by the TNC, at least not yet.
Figure 38: TNC and NAP functionalities
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we described Microsoft Network Access Protection (NAP) as a commer-
cial implementation of NAC-EI. The three basic components within NAP architecture are
the NAP Client, NAP Health Policy Server and NAP Enforcement Point. NAP Client
is a computer running Windows operating system supporting NAP functionality. NAP
Health Policy Server is the entity that makes the network access decision based on the
integrity information provided by the client. NAP Enforcement Point either grants or re-
stricts the access to the network based on the decision made by the Health Policy Server.
The authorization process in NAP is comprised of four phases: system health status re-
porting, network policy compliance verification, network access limitation and automatic
remediation. If the first two phases are combined into one phase, these phases are equiv-
alent to assessment, isolation and remediation in the TNC. Currently NAP supports four
enforcement methods: IPsec, DHCP, 802.1X and VPN.
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4 Future of NAC-EI
In the previous chapters we described two architectures for providing integrity-based
network access control: Trusted Network Connect, which is an open standard architec-
ture, and Network Access Protection which is a commercial product implemented by
Microsoft. We also compared these two architectures with each other, the features and
functionalities that they provide, and the components and interfaces which build up the
architectures. In this chapter we try to analyze what is the future of NAC-EI products: is
it something that is going to be implemented widely in organizations, or is it just fancy
architecture with no real-life use.
4.1 Status Quo
Before we can look into the future, we must first take a look at the current situation. So
far we have presented only two architectures, one of which is an open standard architec-
ture and the other a commercial implementation. In addition to that, we briefly discussed
about Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA), which is an architecture developed by IETF.
But in addition to these there is a wide range of products already in the market. So far we
have used Microsoft NAP as an example implementation, but there are other significant
software and infrastructure companies that have developed their own equivalent products.
Cisco Network Admission Control (CNAC) is an infrastructure product that provides sim-
ilar capabilities as NAP and TNC [49]. Unified Access Control (UAC) is an comparable
product developed by network company Juniper. As Juniper is strongly contributin to the
TNC-WG the UAC complies with the TNC standards. Security company Symantec also
has a network access control implementation which is called Symantec Network Access
Control (SNAC).
Cisco NAC and the TNC have become the two dominant competitors on the area. Ju-
niper, Symantec and a large amount of smaller companies are committed to the TNC
architecture while Cisco, as the leading networking equipment manufacturer, drives its
own solution. However, it seems that Microsoft is trying to balance between these two
parties. In September 2006 Microsoft and Cisco announced interoperability architecture
for Cisco NAC and Microsoft NAP [50]. Less than a year later, in May 2007, Microsoft
and TCG published a white paper describing interoperability between NAP and TNC [48]
using the IF-TNCCS protocol bindings for Microsoft Statement of Health (SoH) protocol.
Cisco has not agreed on supporting the TNC but it is driving the standardization of NAC-
EI by contributing to IETF Network Endpoint Assessment Working Group (NEA-WG)
and one of the two chairmen of the NEA work group is Susan Thompson from Cisco.
However, the co-chair of the work group is Stephen Hanna from Juniper who is also the
co-chair of the TNC Work Group. Because Juniper essentially represents the TNC, it
looks like the NEA could be the point where these two competing architectures finally
converge. As we discussed earlier, the NEA-WG is considering existing protocol imple-
mentations when defining the standards for NAC-EI. As of February 19 of 2008, which
was the deadline for submitting proposals for NEA drafts, the TNC protocols IF-TNCCS
and IF-M were the only proposals submitted. At the time of writing these drafts are at
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version 6 which signifies that the work group is actively developing the drafts into RFCs ,
i.e. official Internet standards. Cisco has not submitted CNAC protocols as proposals for
NEA standards which might be an indicator that TNC is going to win the standardization
competition. It will be interesting to see whether it will enforce Cisco to adapt the TNC
standards.
4.2 Case Studies
In this section we present a few case studies of implementing NAC solutions including
posture-based authorization. St. Mary’s County Public Schools in Maryland implemented
a NAC solution to support a new program which involved 60 laptops connected into a
wireless network. The security was a high concern so the school district implemented
Juniper Unified Access Control (UAC) to enhance the security of the wireless network.
IEEE 802.1X was chosen as the enforcement method and RADIUS as the authentication
server. The agent is dynamically downloaded to the client computers and it provides
capabilities for assessing the security state of the client including anti-malware, anti-virus
and other security software. The result was that the school district was able to implement
a highly secure wireless network by leveraging existing network infrastructure. [51]
The American University in Washington D.C. is a university with about 11000 students,
3000 faculty and approximately 6500 network devices. The university wanted to imple-
ment a NAC solution to mitigate the risk posed by misconfigured clients accessing the
network. Cisco NAC Appliance was chosen as the NAC solution and a Cisco NAC client
was deployed to each student computer accessing the network. As a result, the amount
of malware tickets was reduced by 80 percent and the university was able to provide
role-based access control and better methods to locate problematic clients. [52]
The Fulton County IT department is responsible for thousands of computers and supports
approximately 5000 employees in 400 buildings. After suffering from network disrup-
tions in the past due to non-compliant clients, the county decided to implement a new
security solution. Microsoft NAP was chosen as the implementation. They first evaluated
NAP using DHCP enforcement but decided that it didn’t fulfill the security requirements.
They ended up using IPsec enforcement to support also encryption of network commu-
nication. The county has moved from using cumbersome paper-based security policies
to automated policy enforcement using NAP. According to the pilot implementation, the
service-desk calls have decreased by 75 percent. [53]
Bangchak Petroleum, a Thai energy company, implemented NAC to conform to the ISO
27001 information security management standard. The company implemented various
security mechanisms including Juniper UAC to support endpoint integrity inspection. The
UAC enforces security policies for clients accessing both locally and remotely on the
company network. [54]
St. Monica’s college in Melbourne, Australia needed to build a secure intranet to support
its learning management system as well as unified communication channels including
voice, data and video. The college implemented the infrastructure using Juniper Net-
works’ products including UAC for managing security policies. Using the NAC solution
55
the college was able to enforce extensive security policies using such criteria as groups,
roles, individual users and computers, and time of day. [55]
4.3 Prospective
Figure 39: The importance of NAC solution adherence to an existing framework or stan-
dard [56]
According to a survey made by the Network Computing magazine in 2006, many or-
ganizations are evaluating different NAC implementations [56]. The survey comprised
general NAC implementations, not only products offering posture-based authorization.
The survey shows that in 2006 the NAC products that the organizations were most famil-
iar with were Cisco NAC and Microsoft NAP. Only about 30 percent of the responders
were evaluating the TNC whereas the same figure for CNAC and NAP was almost 40
percent. So the TNC does not have a very strong visibility among organizations. An
interesting detail from the survey is that 48 percent of the responders indicated that they
would not buy a NAC implementation until they understand Microsoft’s role in the mar-
ket. Microsoft’s products are widely adopted in corporate IT infrastructures. By utilizing
existing infrastructure when implementing integrity-based access control organizations
may cut the costs of the implementation. If, for example, an organization’s policy states
that all client computers must have a Windows operating system installed, it means that
by using Microsoft NAP as a NAC-EI solution the IT department does not need to deploy
any additional client software to the client computer, as the NAP client is integrated into
the newest Windows operating systems. NAP was officially released in 2008, two years
after the survey, so the situation has probably changed a bit. The survey also examined
how important it is for organizations that the implementation under evaluation adheres to
a standard or an existing NAC framework. The results are summarized in Figure 39. The
organizations preferred Cisco NAC over Microsoft NAP and TNC, but even more impor-
tant was considered the adherence to any existing standards. This makes the competition
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between Cisco and TNC interesting because now that it looks like that the TNC is becom-
ing an IETF standard through NEA. According to the results presented in Figure 39 this
might have a very positive impact on the adoption of TNC framework in organizations.
[56]
Figure 40: Issues that are driving organizations to adopt NAC solutions [56]
Now we have analyzed a little bit the racing between the different implementations of
integrity-based access control. But is this a feature that is really needed and wanted in
organizations? This is an important question to ask when analyzing the future of NAC-EI
products because that is really what drives the market. During the last few years there has
been a lot of discussion about new defense mechanisms for corporate networks. Recog-
nized security evangelist Steve Riley held up a presentation called ”Death of the DMZ”
a few years back. Riley’s message during the last years has been that the attacks have
moved from network and transport layers to application layer, and that is why the tra-
ditional way of protecting networks and endpoints using perimeter networks has become
obsolete [57]. Because the employees are getting increasingly mobile it is getting increas-
ingly important that the data can be accessed from everywhere. Because the clients are
no longer only within the corporate network, the client cannot be trusted and the security
must coexist in the servers with the data. But how would posture-based access control fit
into this model? Well, the security should always be a made of layers. Using endpoint
integrity as a factor for network access decisions is just providing additional layer of se-
curity. Figure 40 represents the issues that are driving organizations to provision NAC
solutions according to [56]. According to the survey, by far the most important concern
driving to implement NAC is the enforcement of access control policies to resources. The
next most important issues are the ability to address compliance requirements and the
ability to provide controlled access for unmanaged clients: contractors, partners and other
guest users. These figures indicate that the organizations are willing to invest on NAC
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products supporting integrity assessment. Providing access to contractors and partners
is also a high priority issue which is actually the functionality provided by the federated
TNC introduced earlier. However, the specification for the federated TNC is quite new
and at the time of writing there are not any commercial implementations supporting it.
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis we have examined architectures for supporting network access control based
on endpoint integrity. We introduced Trusted Network Connect as an open standard ar-
chitecture developed by Trusted Computing Group. TNC is designed to support exist-
ing network security standards, including RADIUS, EAP and IPsec. It is a feature-rich
architecture supporting endpoint integrity verification, policy enforcement, monitoring,
hardware-based authentication, and federation between security domains.
As a commercial implementation of integrity-based network access control we presented
Microsoft Network Access Protection. NAP provides endpoint health assessment as well
as isolation and remediation of non-compliant clients. It supports four different isola-
tion methods, each of which is suitable for a bit different use case. Microsoft has also
contributed to the TNC Work Group and in 2006 Microsoft and TCG announced interop-
erability between NAP and TNC.
When we compared the TNC and NAP architectures we found that the high-level archi-
tectures are almost identical with certain exceptions. TNC provides some features that are
out of scope when it comes to NAP. These features include federated assessment between
security domains, using Trusted Platform Module to further enhance security, and integra-
tion with a data store containing metadata information about clients in the network. The
last few years have shown that the NAC solutions supporting integrity verification have
divided into two camps: those that support TNC, and those that support Cisco Network
Admission Control. Both sides have dozens of supporting vendors varying small and
medium-sized into large enterprises such as Symantec and Juniper Networks. The main
contributor of the TNC Work Group is Juniper Networks which is the main competitor
of Cisco in the network equipment market. These two organizations are also driving the
IETF Network Endpoint Assessment work group which aims at standardizing the NAC-
EI architecture. As we saw, the NEA has recently adopted TNC protocols as drafts and
is currently working on maturing these into RFCs, i.e. official Internet standards. We
came into the conclusion that TNC is becoming the official standard in the industry even
though the NEA contains only a subset of all the functionalities provided by TNC. This
would be a big step towards interoperability and would probably increase the adoption
of NAC-EI implementation. There are already a lot of case studies available of NAC-EI
implementations, but it seems that many organizations have been postponing their deci-
sion of NAC implementation because of at least two things. The first and most important
factor has been the lack of official industry standards. When there is no standardization
there is always a risk of vendor lock-in, i.e. being dependent on products from only one
vendor. Another important factor, as we saw from a survey made by Network Comput-
ing magazine, has been the role of Microsoft as a provider in this field. Almost every
organization uses Microsoft products in their IT infrastructure. By utilizing existing in-
frastructure when implementing integrity-based access control organizations may cut the
costs of the implementation. Of course this applies to other vendors also. If an orga-
nization has built its corporate network using switches and routers made by Cisco, it is
probably a cost effective solution to use the same provider for NEC-EI also.
Even though it currently looks like the TNC is going to be the industry standard, it is
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important to note that it does not automatically mean that all NAC-EI solutions will aim
at compliance with the standard. Cisco has a strong alliance behind it and this would not
be the first time when a large company like Cisco would use its market share to drive
its own solution regardless of the industry standards. The next few years will show the
direction of this competition.
The analysis that was made in this thesis about the future of NAC-EI was mostly based
on case studies and a survey about NAC solution. The survey was made in 2006 so the
information might not be accurate anymore but it was found useful when trying to find
out the factors that affect the evaluation of different NAC solutions in organizations. In
order to be able to better analyze the direction of the industry we would need a more
accurate picture of the current situation in the organizations. This would require deeper
study and more data gathered using e.g., a survey. Another interesting object for a study
would be to compare the TNC and Cisco NAC architectures. This study might also help
when analyzing the competition between these two frameworks. However, these studies
are out of the scope of this thesis.
60
References
[1] Trusted Computing Group, Microsoft. Standardizing Network Access Control: TNC
and Microsoft NAP to Interoperate, May 2007.
[2] Trusted Computing Group. Backgrounder, November 2006.
[3] TCG Trusted Network Connect. TNC Architecture for Interoperability, Specifica-
tion Version 1.3, Revision 6, April 2008.
[4] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., Tardo J. IETF RFC 5209. Net-
work Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements, June 2008. Web
document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5209.txt
[5] Sangster, P., Narayan, K. IETF Internet Draft. PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute Pro-
tocol (PA) Compatible with TNC, October 2009. Web document. Available at
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-nea-pa-tnc-06.txt
[6] Sahita, R., Hanna, S., Hurst, R., Narayan, K. IETF Internet Draft.
PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute Protocol (PA) Compatible with TNC, Oc-
tober 2009. Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/id/
draft-ietf-nea-pb-tnc-06.txt
[7] TCG Infrastructure Working Group Reference Architecture for Interoperability (Part
I), Specification Version 1.0, Revision 1, June 2009.
[8] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port based Network
Access Control, IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, December 2004.
[9] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-IMC, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 8, Febru-
ary 2007.
[10] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-IMV, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 8, Febru-
ary 2007.
[11] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-TNCCS, Specification Version 1.1, Revision 1.00,
February 2007.
[12] Alvestrand, H. IETF RFC 3066. Tags for the Identification of Languages, January
2001. Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3066.
txt
[13] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-TNCCS: Protocol Bindings for SoH, Specification
Version 1.0, Revision 0.08, May 2007.
[14] SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes. Web document. Available at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers
61
[15] Adoba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., Levkowetz, H., Extensible Authen-
tication Protocol (EAP). Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 3748, June 2004.
Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3748.txt
[16] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., Simpson, W., Remote Authentication Dial In
User Service (RADIUS). Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 2865, June 2000.
Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2865.txt
[17] Simpson, W., The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP). Internet Engineering Task Force,
RFC 1661, July 1994. Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc1661.txt
[18] Dierks, T., Rescorla, E., The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2.
Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 5246, August 2008. Web document. Available
at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
[19] Simpson, W., PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP). Inter-
net Engineering Task Force, RFC 1994, August 1996. Web document. Available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1994.txt
[20] Haller, N., Metz, C., A One-Time Password System. Internet Engineering Task
Force, RFC 1938, May 1996. Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc1938.txt
[21] Simon, D., Aboba, B., Hurst, R., The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol. Inter-
net Engineering Task Force, RFC 5216, March 2008. Web document. Available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5216.txt
[22] TCG TNC Workgroup.TNC IF-M: TLV Binding, Specification Version 1.0, Revi-
sion 30, February 2008.
[23] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-T: Protocol Bindings for Tunneled EAP Methods,
Specification Version 1.1, Revision 10, May 2007.
[24] Kaufman, C., Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol. Internet Engineering Task
Force, RFC 4306, December 2005. Web document. Available at http://www.
ietf.org/rfc/rfc4306.txt
[25] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., Arkko, J., Diameter Base Proto-
col. Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 3588, September 2003. Web document.
Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3588.txt
[26] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-T: Binding to TLS, Specification Version 1.0, Revi-
sion 16, May 2009.
[27] ISO/IEC 11889. Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
[28] TCG Infrastructure Workgroup. Subject Key Attestation Evidence Extension, Spec-
ification Version 1.0, Revision 7, June 2005. Web document. Available at
62
[29] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-PEP: Protocol Bindings for RADIUS, Specification
Version 1.1, Revision 0.7, February 2007.
[30] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Draft Standard for Vir-
tual Bridged Local Area Networks, P802.1Q-2003, January 2003.
[31] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Access Control
(MAC) Bridges, IEEE Std 802.1D-2004, June 2004.
[32] Congdon, P., Sanchez, M., Aboba, B., RADIUS Attributes for Virtual LAN and
Priority Support. Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 4675, September 2006. Web
document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4675.txt
[33] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., Roese, J., IEEE 802.1X Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines. Internet En-
gineering Task Force, RFC 3580, September 2003. Web document. Available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3580.txt
[34] Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege, M., Goyret, I., RADIUS Attributes for
Tunnel Protocol Support. Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 2868, June 2000.
Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2868.txt
[35] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., Aboba, B., Dynamic Authoriza-
tion Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS). Inter-
net Engineering Task Force, RFC 3576, July 2003. Web document. Available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3576.txt
[36] TCG TNC Workgroup. TNC IF-MAP binding for SOAP, Specification Version 1.0,
Revision 25, April 2008.
[37] W3C. SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework (Second Edition), April
2007.
[38] TCG WSS Workgroup. TCG Software Stack (TSS) Specification Version 1.2, Level
1, March 2007.
[39] TCG TNC Workgroup. Federated TNC, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 26, May
2009.
[40] Hughes, J., Maler, E., Lockhart, H., Wisniewki, T., Mishra, P., Ragouzis, N. Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Technical Overview, May 2005.
[41] Microsoft Corporation. Network Access Protection Platform Architecture, February
2008.
[42] Microsoft Corporation. Internet Protocol Security Enforcement in the Network Ac-
cess Protection Platform, February 2008.
63
[43] Palekar, A., Simon, Dan., Zorn, G., Josefsson, S., Protected EAP Pro-
tocol (PEAP). Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Draft, March
2003. Web document. Available at http://tools.ietf.org/id/
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-06.txt
[44] Alexander, S., Droms, R., DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions. Inter-
net Engineering Task Force, RFC 2132, March 1997. Web document. Available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2132.txt
[45] Droms, R., Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. Internet Engineering Task Force,
RFC 2131, March 1997. Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc2131.txt
[46] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Dixon, W., Zorn, G., Booth, S., Securing L2TP using IPsec.
Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 3193, November 2001. Web document. Avail-
able at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3193.txt
[47] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., Taarud, J., Little, W., Zorn, G., Point-to-Point
Tunneling Protocol (PPTP). Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 2637, July 1999.
Web document. Available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2637.txt
[48] Microsoft Corporation, Trusted Computing Group. Standardizing Network Access
Control: TNC and Microsoft NAP to Interoperate, July 2007.
[49] Cisco Systems. Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Executive Overview.
[50] Cisco Systems and Microsoft Corporation. Cisco Network Admission Control
and Microsoft Network Access Protection Interoperability Architecture, September
2006.
[51] Juniper Networks. Case Study. St. Mary’s County Publicic Schools Keep Students
on the Forefront of Science and Technology with Digital Learning Secured by Uni-
fied Access Control, February 2009.
[52] Weakland, E. Network Access Control through Quarantine, Remediation, and Verifi-
cation, May 2008. Web document. Available at http://www.educause.edu/
Resources/NetworkAccessControlthroughQua/162942
[53] Microsoft Corporation. Case Study. Forward-Thinking County Government En-
hances IT Security and Manageability, January 2008. Web document. Available at
http://www.microsoft.com/casestudies/Case_Study_Detail.
aspx?CaseStudyID=4000001286
[54] Juniper Networks. Case Study. Juniniper Networks Puts Bangchak Petroleum on
Track for ISO 27001 Certificication, February 2009.
[55] Juniper Networks. Case Study. St. Monica’s College Builds State-of-the-art Network
With Best-in-class Solutions From Juniper Networks, February 2009.
64
[56] Network Computing. NAC Vendors Square Off, July 2006.
[57] Steve Riley, Directly connect to your corpnet with IPsec
and IPv6, June 2008. Web document. Available at http://
blogs.technet.com/steriley/archive/2008/06/25/
directly-connect-to-your-corpnet-with-ipsec-and-ipv6.
aspx
